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WHEN YES MEANS NO, LEGALLY: AN EIGHTH
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO CLASSIFYING
CONSENTING TEENAGERS
AS SEX OFFENDERS
"If our job is to protect our children, why in the heck would we
want to make them sex offenders for the rest of their lives?"1
INTRODUCTION
In late August of 2009, all other current events were overshadowed
by breaking news that a young woman, who had been reported miss-
ing by her family eighteen years earlier, was found and found alive. In
the wake of the media storm following Jaycee Lee Dugard's rescue
from nearly two decades of captivity and continued sexual abuse by a
convicted sex offender, 2 few people appeared willing to question
whether sex offender laws had gone too far.3 Rather, because individ-
ual states and the federal government typically respond to the discov-
ery of these horrific sexual abuse crimes by enacting such laws, 4 Most
are only willing to question if the laws have gone far enough.5 As a
New York Times editorial aptly put it,
1. Timothy Magaw, Proposals Seek 'Sensitive Balance' in Teen Sexting, DAILY HERALD (Feb.
11, 2010, 10:58 PM), http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=358446&src=109 (quoting Illinois po-
lice officer Richard Wistocki, who supported proposed state legislation that would no longer
require teenagers convicted of sending sexually explicit text messages to register as sex
offenders).
2. Dugard was only eleven years old in 1991 when Phillip Garrido abducted her near her
home in South Lake Tahoe, California. Jacki Lyden, Sex Offender Escaped Notice During Girl's
Captivity, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 3, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
ID=113408859; see also Jay Bookman, Op-Ed., Sex Offender Law Reduces Safety in State, AT-
LANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 2, 2009, at A18. In 1977, Garrido had been sentenced to fifty years for an
unrelated kidnapping and rape in Nevada. Lyden, supra. However, he only served eleven years
before being released in 1988. Id. Three years later, Garrido kidnapped Dugard, and for the
next eighteen years, imprisoned her, used her as his personal sex slave, and fathered two daugh-
ters with her. Id.
3. Neil Steinberg, Op-Ed., Some 'Sex Offenses' Just Aren't, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Aug. 30, 2009, at
12A; but see Kelsie Tregilgas, Comment, Sex Offender Treatment in the United States: The Cur-
rent Climate and an Unexpected Opportunity for Change, 84 TUL. L. REV. 729, 729 (2010)
("While sex-offender laws and policies have garnished unquestioning support from a sector of
the population largely uneducated about the specifics of their implementation and effects, they
have frequently been criticized by scholars, mental health professionals, and others familiar with
the realities of contemporary sex-offender treatment.").
4. See Jamie Fellner, Op-Ed., The Wrong Sex Offender Laws, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at
21.
5. Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 651, 651 (2008).
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[W]hen you consider the recent explosion of local laws designed to
keep sex offenders at bay-restricting where they can live and
work, forcing them to the literal fringes of society, like some human
form of toxic waste-what you see is not a rational system for man-
aging risks and rehabilitating people, but a system for managing
public fear.6
And this apparent system for managing public fear creates a major
dilemma for the emergence of opposing opinions because society sees
"the electorate demand[ing] that legislatures enact more crimes and
tougher sentences, and no interest groups or countervailing political
forces [to] lobby against those preferences."7
Moreover, with the gruesome details of these crimes stamped on
the front page of every newspaper and the thought "that could have
been my child" in every parent's mind, society appears fully willing to
turn a blind eye to precisely what these laws entail and whom they
affect.8 These laws tend to be far-reaching in their restrictions and
over-inclusive in who qualifies as an offender. 9 In turn, a substantial
disconnect has developed between the sexual predators that the laws
were designed to monitor and the large category of offenders actually
affected by the laws. The problem is that these laws are too tempting
to resist-and too easy to enact. When justified by the argument that
harsh sex offender laws are necessary to protect children from the vio-
lent predators potentially lurking in neighborhoods across the coun-
try, showing any opposition to such laws tends to make the individual
look sympathetic to child molesters and sexual predators.' 0
However, amidst the legislative haste and hustle to pass a law even
more draconian than its predecessor, it is important to remember that
Dugard's captor, Phillip Garrido, for the most part wholly complied
with the relevant offender laws throughout the eighteen years he im-
prisoned Jaycee." The United States is a society that prides itself on
6. Wrong Turn on Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at 18A.
7. Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEx. L. Rev. 223, 223 (2007).
8. Accord Caitlin Young, Note, Children Sex Offenders: How the Adam Walsh Child Protec-
tion and Safety Act Hurts the Same Children It Is Trying to Protect, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
CIV. CONFINEMENT 459, 463-64 (2008).
9. See Sarah Tofte, Preventing Sexual Violence: Lessons of the Jaycee Dugard Case, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 20, 2009, at E2.
10. See Steinberg, supra note 3, at 12A.
11. See id.; Marisol Bello, Questions Arise on Monitoring of Sex Offenders, USA TODAY,
Sept. 2, 2009, at 3A.
Every April 5 for the past 10 years, Phillip Garrido registered on his birthday .. . as a
convicted sex offender.
Two to three times a month, he met his parole officer at the parole office or his
Antioch, Calif., home. Since at least January, the state monitored him with a global
positioning device strapped to his ankle.
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teaching its citizens to admit when they are wrong and change what
they can change. Thus, it is time to admit to the obvious flaw in the
system: The laws are not adequately protecting society from those
most likely to cause harm.12 Instead, those most likely to cause harm
are mixed into the whole batch of labeled'3 offenders-a batch that
includes teens convicted of engaging in consensual sex with another
slightly younger teen. As a result, implementing these tough laws that
require all individuals convicted of a sex offense to register is counter-
productive. For one, the laws are counterproductive because law en-
forcement agencies become overwhelmed by and unable to effectively
monitor the large number of registered offenders. 14 In addition, these
tough laws brand an individual a sex offender for life-effectively
ruining any chance at normalcy-although most of society would not
consider this individual to be a sexual threat. 5
While one may be morally opposed to two teenagers having sexual
relations with each other, "sex" is not the proper area for expansive
legislation on morality. There is a fine line between immorality and
criminality. As many of these state sex offender laws currently stand,
this fine line is better known as the Eighth Amendment-and labeling
a teenager in a consensual sexual relationship a "sex offender" consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment.16 In November 2009, a Michigan
court of appeals agreed by ruling that it is a cruel and unusual punish-
ment to require an eighteen-year-old to register as a sex offender for
having a consensual sexual relationship with his nearly fifteen-year-
old girlfriend, the young woman to whom he is now married.' 7
Admittedly, it is an uphill if not an unwinnable battle to fight for
protecting the rights of convicted sex offenders-regardless of the cir-
cumstances surrounding their individual offenses. But the purpose of
this Comment is not to try to do so. Rather, this Comment looks at
those "offenders" who never should have been nor ever should be
Yet police say he managed to conceal Jaycee Lee Dugard, who he is accused of kid-
napping and sexually abusing, in a squalid backyard encampment for 18 years.
Id.
12. Accord Tofte, supra note 9, at E2.
13. I use the term "labeled" loosely because, as this Comment argues, there are clearly per-
sons who do not fit the profile of a sex offender as set by society-yet because of their states'
laws, these persons are nonetheless labeled as sex offenders.
14. See Bello, supra note 11, at 3A.
15. See Susan L. Pollet, Op-Ed., Teens and Sex Offenses: Where Should the Law Draw the
Lines?, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2009, at 4 (discussing the irreparable consequences that naturally
follow from having to register as a sex offender, including employment and housing barriers,
victimization from vigilantism, ostracism from society, and depression).
16. See infra notes 195-343 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
2011] 1171
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
labeled a sex offender. "While crimes of sexual violence and abuse
against children are among the most vile crimes that humans commit,
a sexual act between two consenting teenagers does not logically fall
into that same category."18 Accordingly, this Comment discusses the
need for states to follow the approach recently taken by the federal
government and amend their sex offender registration and notifica-
tion laws to no longer apply to consensual sexual acts between two
teenagers-close in age-but with one teenager below the state's rele-
vant age of consent. 19 This Comment also conducts an Eighth
Amendment analysis, weighing the relevant factors to determine
whether applying the sex offender laws to teens convicted of engaging
in consensual sex with another teen below the age of consent consti-
tutes cruel and unusual punishment.20
The latter portion of the Comment begins by assuming that there is
a nationwide prohibition against requiring teens to register and abide
by notification laws to ensure that they no longer fall within the scope
of any sex offender laws.21 In this way, the Comment is able to ad-
dress a likely implication that may follow from such action. For in-
stance, without individuals like these teenagers clogging up registries
and wasting law enforcement agencies' time and resources, which are
currently being spent monitoring nondangerous offenders, the true
purpose of sex offender laws-to protect the community from the
most vicious and violent offenders-will be better served. Finally, this
Comment explores an alternative way of dealing with consensual
teenage sex.2 2 Instead of punishing one or both of the teenagers after
they have engaged in consensual sex, it may be within society's best
interests to implement some sort of mandatory sex education program
that would teach teenagers the potential grave consequences that fol-
low from having unsafe sex as well as enable them to make their own
decisions about when they actually choose to have sex for the first
time.
II. BACKGROUND
This Part first explores the prevalence of sexual activity among
teenagers today as compared to fifty years ago to show societal change
in how teenagers view and respond to sexual acts prior to marriage. It
next addresses the evolution and status of state and federal sex of-
18. See Bookman, supra note 2, at A18.
19. See infra notes 259-79 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 195-343 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 356-79 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 380-94 and accompanying text.
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fender registration and notification laws in the United States, as well
as the "Romeo and Juliet" exception that protects certain teenage sex
offenders. Finally, this Part concludes by providing an overview of
how the Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
A. Teenage Sexuality in the Twenty-First Century
"Whether we like it or not, sexual desire is part of being a teen
"23
Thanks in part to the media, societal views regarding sex and sexu-
ality have changed dramatically since the Baby Boomer Era. 2 4 The
perhaps naive but indisputably censored days of Dick Van Dyke and I
Love Lucy are over.25 Now, not only are television sitcom parents no
longer sleeping in separate beds, neither are children.26 While it is
undoubtedly an exaggeration of reality, there is more than a mere ker-
nel of truth in shows like Gossip Girl27 where the viewer can watch
the teen characters engage in sexual rendezvous with near strangers
on a weekly basis. But Gossip Girl is not alone in this category; and
while Gossip Girl may be more up-front with its viewers about the
sexual nature of the show's plot, the otherwise praised show Glee has
faced its fair share of criticism when it comes to portraying teen sex.2 8
23. Laura Berman, True Love and Teenage Hormones Won't Wait, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 24,
2007, at 30.
24. G.S. Abbott & D. Treboux, Teen Sexuality, in 23 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 15537, 15537 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001).
25. Gail Pennington, Op-Ed., Sex on TV: From Twin Beds to "Temptation Island," We've
Come a Long Way, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Feb. 11, 2001, at F3.
On "I Love Lucy," the most popular TV sitcom of the 1950s, Lucy and Ricky Ri-
cardo slept in twin beds, safely separated by a nightstand.
A decade later, Rob and Laurie Petrie of "The Dick Van Dyke Show" may have
smooched regularly, but they were still stuck in those twin beds, with that nightstand in
between.
Id.
26. See Belinda Luscombe, The Truth About Teen Girls, TIME, Sept. 22, 2008, at 66, 66 (noting
the trend in popular television shows to capitalize on sexual promiscuity among teenagers).
27. See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Rethinking Sex Offender Laws for Youths Showing off Online,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2010, at Al ("We're at this cultural shift ... because of what's happening in
terms of representation of teen sexuality as you can see on 'Gossip Girl."' (quoting New York
University law professor Amy Adler)); Melena Ryzik, Omigosh!'OC' with Warmer Duds?, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 12, 2007, at El.
The sex starts about five minutes into the premiere of "Gossip Girl," a new series
based on the best-selling young-adult books by Cecily von Ziegesar. Within 20 minutes
the characters, privileged Upper East Side private schoolers, are downing martinis at
the Palace Hotel. There is some pot smoking in Central Park, and more sex . . ..
Ryzik, supra, at El.
28. See Robert Bianco, 'Glee' Loses Its Voice in the Chaos, USA TODAY, Mar. 15, 2011, at ID
("In some ways, Glee's slips are typical of shows that become too hot too fast, indulging in too
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Sex appears to be everywhere-at least everywhere on TV.29 And at
the end of the day, even seemingly innocent networks like Nickelo-
deon cannot completely avoid the topic of sex and teen pregnancy.30
In reality, there has been a clear, dramatic increase in the rates of
sexual activity among teenagers since the 1950s. 31 The most recent
statistics estimate that 48% of all high school students have had sexual
intercourse. 32 This statistic jumps to nearly 65% for recent high
school graduates. 33 Of sexually active high school students, 15% have
had four or more sexual partners.34 Among sexually active female
teenagers, about 74% reported having a sexual partner of either the
same age or one to three years older.35 And only 8% of these female
many big-name guests and too many gimmick-laden 'very special' episodes. Last week gave us
the worst of both worlds, with an all-consuming Gwyneth Paltrow return visit that played like a
South Park spoof on after-school specials-one designed to encourage teenage sex. Once we
might have heard Artie sing a sensitive song about adolescent desire and confusion; now we get
Paltrow leading the kids in Do You Wanna Touch Me."); Paige Wiser, Choir Hazard: Racy
Moments on 'Glee' Alarm Parents Expecting Clean Entertainment, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Oct. 19,
2010, at 28 ("This season, the salaciousness is less subtle. In the Britney Spears episode alone,
the Parents Television Council complained about 'narcotic drug abuse, public masturbation and
school-sanctioned burlesque."').
29. For a discussion on the prevalence of sex on TV networks like MTV, see Alessandra
Stanley, Sexy Kids? O.K. But a Channel from Arabs? No., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,2011, at C1 ("But
sex is sexier than foreign affairs, and it certainly sells better.").
30. Lawrence Van Gelder, Jamie Lynn Spears Is Pregnant at 16, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, at
E2.
Jamie Lynn Spears .. . the 16-year-old star of the popular Nickelodeon series "Zoey
101" and the sister of the troubled singer Britney Spears ... said she was 12 weeks
pregnant . .. . In a statement, Nickelodeon said: "We respect Jamie Lynn's decision to
take responsibility in this sensitive and personal situation."
Id.
31. See Abbott & Treboux, supra note 24, at 15538; Teen-Age Sex Activity Is Found to Level
Off, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 1995, at A14 ("After steadily increasing since the 1950's, the number of
teen-agers who had sex has steadied .... ).
32. 2007 Results: Ever Had Sexual Intercourse, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PRE-
VENTION, http://apps.nccd.cdc.gov/youthonline (select "Sexual Behaviors" hyperlink under
"View One Question For All Locations"; then select "Ever Had Sexual Intercourse" hyperlink
under "Sexual Behaviors"; then select "2007" from dropdown menu within "Choose Table Con-
tent"; then follow "GO" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) [hereinafter CDC: Students]; see
also John Santelli et al., Trends in Sexual Risk Behaviors, by Nonsexual Risk Behavior Involve-
ment, U.S. High School Students, 1991-2007,44 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 372, 376 (2009) ("[T]he
percentage of students reporting ever having engaged in sexual intercourse declined between
1991 and 2007, 54% of all students in 1991 to 48% in 2007.").
33. See CDC: Students, supra note 32 (select "12th Grade" radio button under "Filter Data"
column).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTER FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVEN-
TION AND HEALTH PROMOTION, TRENDS IN PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL BEHAVIORs, available at
http://cdc.gov/healthyyouthlyrbs/pdflus-sexual-trend-yrbs.pdf.
35. Joyce C. Abma et al., Teenagers in the United States: Sexual Activity, Contraceptive Use,
and Childbearing, 2002, 23 VITAL HEALTH STATISTICS 1, 8 (2004).
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teenagers reported having a partner more than six years older.36
Moreover, 75% were in an exclusive relationship when they had sex
for the first time.37
In terms of practicing safe sex, 74% of female teens used some form
of contraception the first time they had sex, while 71% of males used
a condom.38 This is a major improvement from the statistics reported
in 1980 showing that only 43% of females and 39% of males used a
method of contraception during their first sexual experience.39 Fur-
thermore, of the teens that remain sexually active after their first ex-
perience, 90% continue to use some form of contraception when
having sex. 4 0 This significant improvement in safe sex practices be-
tween teens has led to a considerable decrease in teen pregnancies
and birth rates. 41 Between 1990 and 2002, female teen pregnancy
rates dropped 35%, while birth rates between 1991 and 2005 dropped
34%.42 Similarly, "[t]he rate of abortions among teens also plum-
meted, to [nearly twenty] per 1,000 women in 2004 from a high of 43.5
per 1,000 in 1988."43 However, even considering the dramatic reduc-
tion in numbers, the United States still ranks the highest among other
developed nations in terms of teen pregnancies, births, and
abortions."
Likely as a result of the statistics listed above, there appears to be a
growing trend in providing teens with access to contraceptives as a
means to promote "safe sex"-instead of simply "no sex." For the
first time, the federal government took a non-abstinence stance when
the Food and Drug Administration issued a statement that seventeen-
year-olds would now be able to purchase morning-after contraceptive
pills without a doctor's prescription. 45 In addition, after the alleged
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 9.
39. See id.
40. See Abbott & Treboux, supra note 24, at 15538.
41. Santelli et al., supra note 32, at 372-73.
42. Id. (discrepancy in years is due to more recent data being available concerning birth
rates).
43. Knocked Down: Pregnancy 'Pact' Drew Headlines, But Teen Pregnancies Are at Lowest
Level in 30 Years, Ci. TRIB., June 30, 2008, at 6.
44. Id.
45. See Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) ("The FDA is also or-
dered to permit Barr Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Plan B drug sponsor, to make Plan B available to
17 year olds without a prescription, under the same conditions as Plan B is now available to
women over the age of 18."); see also Gardiner Harris, Agency Agrees to Ease Access to Emer-
gency Contraceptive for 17-Year-Olds, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 2009, at A14 (reporting the lowering
of the minimum age from eighteen to seventeen for which a person can purchase morning-after
contraceptive pills without a doctor's prescription).
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"pregnancy pact" scandal at a Gloucester, Massachusetts high school
led to news sources speculating that multiple teenagers had purposely
become pregnant, 46 more towns and school boards are breaking their
silence on sex and are starting to consider providing their students
with some form of or access to contraceptives. 47
B. History of Sex Offender Notification and Registration Laws
"[W]e're sending a clear message across the country: those who
prey on our children will be caught, prosecuted and punished to the
fullest extent of the law." 48
Currently, more than 700,000 sex offenders are registered nation-
wide.49 Sex offenders are among the most feared and reviled mem-
bers of society.50 Because studies have shown that sex offenders are
46. Katie Zezima, Spike in School's Pregnancies Leads to Report that Some Resulted from
Girls' Pact, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A15.
At least 17 girls at the public high school in the seaside town of Gloucester, Mass.,
are expecting babies, and a Time magazine report says nearly half became pregnant
after making a pact to do so and raise the children together. Local officials . . . would
not confirm the existence of such a pact but acknowledged that many of the 17
pregnancies-a total four times as many as last school year at the 1,200-student
school-had been intentional.
Id.
47. See, e.g., Katie Zezima, Massachusetts: Contraceptives at School, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2008, at A20 (noting that, made famous by the alleged "pregnancy pact," Gloucester's school
board voted "to allow birth control pills and condoms to be made available at the town's high
school"); see also DeeDee Correll, 6 Denver High Schools May Offer Birth Control, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 24,2007, at All ("Denver school officials are considering a proposal to dispense contracep-
tives in its six high-school-based health clinics . . . ."); Neil Gonzales, Daly City School May Offer
Condoms to Students, OAKLAND TRIB. (Jan. 10, 2009), http://www.highbeam.com/doclP2-19726
997.html (commenting that after announcing the possibility that the high school would follow
the trends of neighboring schools in making condoms available, the superintendent responded,
"The school board is faced with the reality that a lot of young people are having sex .... While
most adults like to believe kids are not doing this, the reality is they are . . . ."); Steven Rosen-
berg, Birth Control Battle in Reverse-Vote Is Sought to Halt Distribution at School, BosToN
GLOBE (Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.boston.com/newsleducation/k_12/articles/2009/09/06/birth_
control battleinjrevere/ ("Currently, Revere High School students who have parental approval
can receive free condoms and prescriptions for birth control pills.").
48. Press Release, White House, President George W. Bush, President Signs H.R. 4472, the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (July 27, 2006) [hereinafter White House
Press Release], available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/07/
20060727-6.html (reporting President Bush's explanation of the intent behind sex offender regis-
tration and notification laws).
49. Alan Greenblatt, States Struggle to Control Sex Offender Costs, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May
28, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=127220896.
50. See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, AN AMERICAN TRAvESTY: LEGAL RESPONSES To ADOLES-
CENT SEXUAL OFFENDING 26 (2004).
The rapist and child molester historically have been sources of public outrage and
fear throughout Western nations . . . . The child molester . . . is so detested among
prisoners that he is at high risk of attack by them and often must be held in protective
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much more likely to reoffend than other violent criminals,5' it makes
sense that society teaches children to stay away from strangers before
teaching them how to tie a shoe, make their bed, or read a book. As a
result, over the course of the past fifteen years, every state and the
federal government has enacted some form of sex offender registra-
tion and notification law.5 2
1. The Jacob Wetterling Program and the Birth of Federal Sex
Offender Legislation
In 1994, Congress enacted the first major piece of federal legislation
in this area.53 The law was in response to the abduction of eleven-
year-old Jacob Wetterling from near his Minnesota home in 1989.54
Family and friends of Jacob lobbied for child safety, and with the en-
actment of the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexu-
ally Violent Offender Act5 5 (the Jacob Wetterling Program) came the
requirement that states implement a sex offender registry program or
risk losing up to 10% of federal funds otherwise to be directed toward
state and local law enforcement.56 Specifically, the Jacob Wetterling
Program "[e]stablished guidelines for states to track sex offenders"57
and "[r]equired states to track sex offenders by confirming their place
of residence annually for ten years after their release into the commu-
nity or quarterly for the rest of their lives if the sex offender was con-
segregation from the rest of the general prison population, sometimes in separate
facilities.
Id.
51. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 33 (2002) (citing Recidivism Statistics from a U.S. Dep't
of Justice report) ("When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely
than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault."); Todd S.
Purdum, Clinton Backs Plan to Track Sex Offenders Nationwide, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, at
17 ("A 15-year study by the California Department of Justice of 1,300 sex offenders arrested in
1973, found that ... sex offenders were five times more likely than other violent offenders and
more than six times more likely than all types of offenders to commit another sex offense.").
52. Joanna S. Markman, Community Notification and the Perils of Mandatory Juvenile Sex
Offender Registration: The Dangers Faced by Children and Their Families, 32 SETON HALL
LEGIs. J. 261, 276 (2008).
53. Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14071
(2006)).
54. See Jacob's Story, JACOB WETTERLING RESOURCE CENTER, http://jwrc.org/WhoWeArel
History/JacobsStory/tabid/108/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Jacob's
Story].
55. 42 U.S.C. § 14071.
56. Richard Meryhew, Jacob's Legacy: Ten Years of Heartache Haven't Weakened Patty Wet-
terling's Tireless Resolve to Protect Children, STAR TRIB., Oct. 17, 1999, at 1A,
57. Federal Sex Offender Legislation, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE: OFFcE OF SEX OFFENDER SEN-
TENCING, MONITORING, APPREHENDING, REGISTERING, & TRACKING (SMART), http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/smart/legislation.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter SMART].
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victed of a violent sex crime."58 Although considered to be the
catalyst for the fifteen years of sex offender legislation to follow, the
Jacob Wetterling Program did not require the dissemination of regis-
tered offenders' personal information. 59 Just short of two months
prior to President Clinton signing the Jacob Wetterling Program into
law, a heinous crime ripped through a quaint New Jersey town, expos-
ing a need for public dissemination of the most dangerous registered
sex offenders' personal information.60
2. Megan's Law and the Public's Right to Know
On an otherwise typical summer evening in late July of 1994, Mau-
reen Kanka realized something was wrong when her seven-year-old
daughter Megan never returned from supposedly playing with a
friend.61 Hoping a neighbor had recently seen Megan or knew of her
whereabouts, Maureen went door to door until she came upon two
middle-aged men casually talking in a driveway across the street.62
One of the men calmly admitted he had indeed seen Megan but that it
had been much earlier that afternoon.63 Maureen had no idea that
this man was "twice-convicted sex offender" Jesse Timmendequas. 64
But more importantly, Maureen had no idea that earlier Jesse had
lured her daughter into his home with the promise of seeing his puppy
and then "slapped, strangled and sexually assaulted her before ...
wrapp[ing] two plastic bags around her head."65 Jesse then took the
58. Id.
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071; see also Brittney M. Bowater, Comment, Adam Walsh Child Pro-
tection and Safety Act of 2006: Is There a Better Way to Tailor the Sentence for Juvenile Sex
Offenders?, 57 CATH. U. L. REv. 817, 822 (2008).
60. See David M. Heger, Jacob, Megan, and Pam: Federal Sex Offender Registration Legisla-
tion, NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN PREVENTION RES. CENTER (Sept. 25, 2000), http://
www.musc.edulvawprevention/policy/fedoffender.shtml.
61. William Glaberson, Mother of Slain Girl Takes the Stand as Trial Begins, N.Y. TIMEs, May
6, 1997, at B4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see also William Glaberson, At Center of 'Megan's' Case, a Man No One Could Reach,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 28, 1996, at 1.
[Jesse] had pleaded guilty twice before to sexually assaulting small children. In 1981,
a judge had labeled him a "compulsive, repetitive sexual offender." Then, after he had
served more than seven years for his two crimes, he and two other convicted child
molesters quietly moved here, into a neighborhood of split-level homes where people
tend their gardens and their children well. Not long afterward, Megan Kanka was
killed.
Id.
65. See Glaberson, supra note 61, at B4.
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girl's tiny, lifeless body, forced it into an old toy chest, and disposed of
it among high weeds in a nearby park.66
Just months after gruesome details of Megan's rape and murder
captured headlines across the nation, her home state of New Jersey
enacted a law in her name that "required notification to [a] commu-
nity when a convicted sex offender was a resident." 67 Two years later,
Congress federalized New Jersey's Megan's Law, thereby amending
the Jacob Wetterling Program by requiring not just private registra-
tion but also public registration and notification. 68 Thus, "[t]he enact-
ment of this legislation marked the birth of federally mandated
community notification." 6 9 As a result, by the turn of the century, all
fifty states had enacted some form of sex offender registration and
notification laws. 70
3. The Adam Walsh Act's Expansion to the Sex Offender National
Registry
The most recent piece of sex offender legislation, signed into law in
the summer of 2006, was arguably twenty-five years in the making.71
The historical underpinnings of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and
Safety Act of 2006 (the Adam Walsh Act) began long before Megan's
and Jacob's disappearances. In July 1981, years before Megan was
even born and when Jacob was only a toddler, six-year-old Adam
Walsh vanished from a Florida department store.72 Two weeks later
and 120 miles away, fishermen discovered Adam's severed head in a
canal.73 The rest of his body was never found.74 For the next twenty-
five years, Adam Walsh became synonymous with the national cru-
66. Id.
67. Markman, supra note 52, at 277; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-6 (West 2009).
68. Kevin Coyne, For Megan's Dad, A Way to Make an Impact, Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
2009, at 1; see 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2) (2006).
The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release relevant information that
is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific person required to register ....
The release of information under this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an
Internet site containing such information that is available to the public ....
Id.
69. Bowater, supra note 59, at 823.
70. Lori McPherson, Update: Practitioner's Guide to the Adam Walsh Act, 20 NAT'L CENTER
FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE 1, 1 (2007).
71. See White House Press Release, supra note 48 (President Bush chose to sign the Act on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of Adam's abduction from a department store); see also Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587.
72. Yolanne Almanzar, 27 Years Later, Case Is Closed in Slaying of Abducted Child, N.Y.
TiMEs, Dec. 17, 2008, at A18.
73. Yolanne Almanzar, An Answer, Finally, for Walsh Family, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 17, 2008, at 6
(noting that in December of 2008, Hollywood, Florida police named Ottis Toole, a serial killer
who died in prison in 1996, as Adam's killer-thereby finally closing the twenty-seven year old
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sade for better laws protecting children against sex offenders. In ef-
fect, the Adam Walsh Act entirely replaced the Jacob Wetterling
Program, including the provision concerning Megan's Law.7 5 The
congressional intent behind the Adam Walsh Act was to correct the
inadvertent loopholes caused by both the Jacob Wetterling Program
and Megan's Law, which had allowed for some of the most dangerous
sex offenders to completely evade the system and live within a com-
munity without its knowledge.76 President George W. Bush stated
that the Adam Walsh Act would execute this objective by "ex-
pand[ing] the National Sex Offender Registry by integrating the infor-
mation in State sex offender registry systems and ensuring that law
enforcement has access to the same information across the United
States."77
Including a total of seven titles, Title I of the Adam Walsh Act-
better known as the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act78
cold case: police admitted Toole was their prime suspect all along but due to "flaws in the
department's investigation" they were unable to conclusively link him to the murder sooner).
74. Id.
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 16902 (2006) ("This chapter establishes the Jacob Wetterling, Megan Ni-
cole Kanka, and Pam Lychner Sex Offender Registration and Notification Program."); see also
The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg. 30,210,
30,211 (Office of the Attorney Gen. May 30, 2007).
Following the enactment of the Wetterling Act in 1994, that Act was amended a
number of times, in part reflecting and in part promoting trends in the development of
the State registration and notification programs. Ultimately, Congress concluded that
the patchwork of standards that had resulted from piecemeal amendments should be
replaced with a comprehensive new set of standards ....
Id.
76. See Sex-Offenders: History, NAT'L CENTER FOR MISSING & EXPLOITED CHILDREN, http://
www.missingkids.comlmissingkids/serviet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=enUS&Pageld=3032
(last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
Megan's Law ... requires all states to conduct community notification but does not
set out specific forms and methods, other than requiring the creation of internet sites
containing state sex-offender information. Beyond that requirement, states are given
broad discretion in creating their own policies.
Despite states' implementation of the Jacob Wetterling Act, the increased mobility of
our society has led to "lost" sex offenders. The "lost" are those who fail to comply with
registration duties yet remain undetected due to the inconsistencies among state laws,
coupled with the burden faced by authorities to keep track of the increasing number of
offenders.
Id.
77. Remarks on Signing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 42
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1395, 1396 (July 26, 2006).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 16924(a)(1) (giving states three years from the date of enactment-July 27,
2006-to implement the requisite provisions of a national registry in compliance with SORNA);
but see Editorial, The Problem of Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2009, at A20 (reporting
the extension of the deadline for states to comply with SORNA until July 2010); Wendy Koch,
Changes Would Give Sex-Offender Law Flexibility, USA TODAY, May 18, 2010, at 2A (explain-
1180
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(SORNA)-has by far generated the most attention among the ti-
tles. 79 Because SORNA mandates only a minimum set of national
standards for registration and community notification,80 it does not
prohibit states from going beyond these standards by enacting their
own more restrictive set of requirements.81 Therefore, although
SORNA excludes from registration "offense[s] involving consensual
sexual conduct . . . if the victim was at least [thirteen] years old and
the offender was not more than four years older than the victim," 8 2
states are free to impose their own requirements and mandate disclo-
sure for offenses involving consensual sex between teenagers of simi-
lar ages.83 In addition, unlike prior federal legislation, SORNA
expressly requires both adults and juveniles to register as sex
offenders. 84
ing that states must either "implement the law by July 27 or receive a one-year extension (as
many have) [or] risk losing 10% in federal crime-fighting funds"); Emanuella Grinberg, No
Longer a Registered Sex Offender, But the Stigma Remains, CNN.com (Feb. 11, 2010), http://
www.cnn.com/2010/CRIME/02/11/oklahoma.teen.sex.offender/index.html?iref=allsearch (noting
that Ohio is the only state to have complied with SORNA).
79. See, e.g., Stephanie Gaylord Forbes, Note, Sex, Cells, and SORNA: Applying Sex Offender
Registration Laws to Sexting Cases, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1729-39 (2011) (discussing
the controversy surrounding the ambiguity of SORNA provisions as applied to juvenile offend-
ers); Tara L. Merrill, United States v. Juvenile Male: Evaluation of the Retroactive Application of
Sex Offender Registration Laws to Former Juvenile Offenders, 12 J. L. & FAM. SruD. 261, 262
(2010) (discussing the "considerable debate in the Senate regarding whether SORNA should
apply to juveniles at all, and if so, to what extent"); Terra R. Lord, Closing Loopholes or Creat-
ing More? Why a Narrow Application of SORNA Threatens to Defeat the Statute's Purpose, 62
OKLA. L. REV. 273, 291-92, 305 (2010) (discussing the various debates over and criticism of
SORNA's requirements).
80. See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg.
30,210, 30,210 (Office of the Attorney Gen. May 30, 2007).
81. See id. at 30,212.
This is so because the general purpose of SORNA is to protect the public from sex
offenders and offenders against children through effective sex offender registration and
notification, and it is not intended to preclude or limit jurisdictions' discretion to adopt
more extensive or additional registration and notification requirements to that end.
Id.
82. See id. at 30,217 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C): "An offense involving consensual sex-
ual conduct is not a sex offense for the purposes of this subchapter if . .. the victim was at least
13 years old and the offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim.").
83. Mary Graw Leary, Sexting or Self-Produced Child Pornography? The Dialogue Contin-
ues-Structured Prosecutorial Discretion Within a Multidisciplinary Response, 17 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 486, 517 (2010); see also Koch, supra note 78, at 2A (quoting Linda Baldwin, the
head of the Justice Department's compliance office, as remarking that "[t]he handling of juvenile
sex offenders has been one of the most contentious issues for states trying to implement the
Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006").
84. See Bowater, supra note 59, at 828; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16911(8).
The term "convicted" . . . used with respect to a sex offense, includes adjudicated
delinquent as a juvenile for that offense, but only if the offender is 14 years of age or
older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more
severe than aggravated sexual abuse . ...
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Another significant change from prior sex offender legislation is
that the Adam Walsh Act establishes standards to promote greater
uniformity across public sex offender Web sites.85 Previously, such
legislation only required the establishment of state sex offender Web
sites but left discretion to the states over which registrants and what
information would be posted.86 Furthermore, states are supposed to
apply the Adam Walsh Act retroactively, meaning that jurisdictions
are required to register all sex offenders, even those offenders who
were convicted at a time when their offenses did not require
registration.87
4. Brief Overview of Sex Offender Residency Restrictions
In addition to the federal registration and notification laws previ-
ously mentioned, society's increased fear of sexual predators has led
to more than twenty states and hundreds of municipalities enacting
their own legislation further restricting where convicted sex offenders
can live.8 8 Known as "residency restrictions," these laws impose
heavy burdens on offenders and their families by prohibiting the regis-
tered offender from living within a certain distance from a place
where children congregate-typically 1,000 to 2,500 feet.89 Many of
the laws also prohibit an offender from either "loitering" or "work-
ing" in those same areas.90
Id.
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 16918(a).
[E]ach jurisdiction shall make available on the Internet, in a manner that is readily
accessible to all jurisdictions and to the public, all information about each sex offender
in the registry. The jurisdiction shall maintain the Internet site in a manner that will
permit the public to obtain relevant information for each sex offender by a single query
for any given zip code or geographic radius set by the user.
Id.
86. Stacey Stowe, Talks Set to Begin on Sex Offender Site, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 2001, at 6. See
Adam Doeringer, Comment, Rehabilitating Juvenile Sex Offenders with a Life Sentence, 42 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 187, 189 (2008); see also Press Release, Laura L. Rogers, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Sex Offender Registry Laws: From Jacob Wetterling to Adam Walsh (July 2007).
87. See The National Guidelines for Sex Offender Registration and Notification, 72 Fed. Reg.
30,210, 30,228 (Office of the Attorney Gen. May 30, 2007).
88. See No Easy Answers: Sex Offender Laws in the US, 19 HuM. RTs. WATCH 1, 139-41
(2007) [hereinafter No Easy Answers], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
us0907webwcover.pdf (listing sex offender registry restriction statutes by state); see also Kari
White, Note, Where Will They Go? Sex Offender Residency Restrictions as Modem-Day Banish-
ment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 161, 170 (2008) ("New Jersey remains without a statewide resi-
dency restriction, but over 110 towns have passed [such] restrictions.").
89. See No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 100.
90. See White, supra note 88, at 166-67.
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The rationale behind the "[n]ot in [m]y [b]ackyard" 91 mentality in
restricting where a sex offender can live, loiter, or work is that it
should help to decrease "the likelihood of reoffense by limiting the
offender's temptation and reducing the opportunity to commit a new
crime." 92 However, because many of these individual residency re-
strictions have the practical effect of prohibiting an offender from le-
gally residing in any large area of a state,93 some scholars argue that
these laws tend to force offenders "to go underground by either not
registering or by providing fake addresses." 94 These same scholars
further believe that by "[t]aking away housing, employment, and
treatment options" that help keep sex offenders' lives stable, certain
types of residency restrictions and their progeny are actually counter-
productive in preventing cases of recidivism. 95
C. "Romeo and Juliet" Exceptions and the Creation of Age Gaps to
Prevent Close-in-Age and Consenting Teens from
Classification as Status Offenders
Every state in the United States criminalizes sexual activity with
someone below the "age of consent," a crime typically referred to as
"statutory rape."96  By definition, statutory rape consists of
"[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent
(as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person's
will." 9 7 Proponents of these laws claim that regardless of the close-
ness in age between the two parties, sex with a person below a certain
age can never be consensual because below a certain age, one lacks
the "capacity to consent." 98 In contrast, opponents argue that because
91. Cassie Dallas, Comment, Not in My Backyard: The Implications of Sex Offender Resi-
dency Ordinances in Texas and Beyond, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1235 (2009).
92. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 720 (8th Cir. 2005).
93. See Dallas, supra note 91, at 1246.
94. Rhiannon K. Thoreson, Comment, Sex Offender Residency Restrictions Are Not "OK":
Why Oklahoma Needs to Amend the Sex Offenders Registration Act, 44 TULSA L. REV. 617, 617
(2009) (noting that "[aifter expanding residenc[y] restrictions in 2006, many Oklahoma jurisdic-
tions saw an increase in the number of lost offenders"-meaning many convicted sex offenders
chose to face the consequences of not registering instead of the consequences of the residency
restrictions).
95. Id. at 638.
96. See No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 72.
97. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1374 (9th ed. 2009).
98. Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the Construction of
Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313, 315 (2003) ("The justification usually
put forward for age of consent laws is the protection of young persons from sexual exploitation
by adults."); see also ZIMRING, supra note 50, at 17.
The law prohibits a wide range of predatory sexual contact with persons considered
incapable of giving what is deemed legitimate consent to sexual participation... . While
the sexual use of immature victims was often classified as a "statutory rape" because of
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statutory rape is a strict liability offense,99 situations often arise where
a statutory rape law actually penalizes two teenagers for engaging in
what would otherwise be deemed "wholly consensual" sex.'00
Society designates these teenagers as sexual "status offenders" be-
cause it is solely the status of their alleged victim falling below the age
of consent that criminalizes the offender's sexual behavior.101 How-
ever, over the course of the past decade, many states, as well as the
federal government, have implemented "age-gap" provisions exempt-
ing certain teenagers from the unyielding scope of statutory rape and
sex offender registration and notification laws where their partner is
below the age of consent but within a certain range to the "offender's"
age. 102 "[R]ecogniz[ing] that sex between two young people is in
some way less punishable than sex between a young person and an
adult," legislators created these "Romeo and Juliet" exceptions so as
to lessen or eliminate penalties for young people. 03
Over the past few years, there appeared to be a trend emerging;
more states and municipalities seemed willing to discuss implementing
"Romeo and Juliet" exceptions to their state sex offender laws. In the
summer of 2007, governors in seven states signed legislation excluding
teens from either prosecution or registration for engaging in consen-
sual sex with another teen.104 However, the Adam Walsh Act "estab-
lishes minimum requirements regarding which [category of] sex
the inability of the young to give legal consent, the more appropriate theory of penal
liability for this class of sexual conduct is predation without force, in which the wrong-
fulness of the sexual contact stems from exploitation of the vulnerability and incapacity
of the victim.
ZIMRING, supra note 50, at 17.
99. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 998 (9th ed. 2009) (defining strict liability as "[1]iability
that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the breach of
an absolute duty to make something safe"); see also Phoebe Geer, Justice Served? The High Cost
of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 33, 44 (2008) ("A person
who has participated in a sexual interaction with the underage person has committed a sexual
offense even though the underage person was a willing participant.").
100. Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory
Rape, 48 Bure. L. REV. 703, 707 (2000).
101. See Young, supra note 8, at 465.
102. The Adam Walsh Act now excludes a teen convicted of engaging in consensual sex with
another teen below the relevant age of consent from having to register as a sex offender. 42
U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C) (2006) ("An offense involving consensual sexual conduct is not a sex of-
fense for the purposes of this subchapter if . . . the victim was at least 13 years old and the
offender was not more than 4 years older than the victim."); see also Markman, supra note 52, at
273-75.
103. Sabrina A. Perelman, A Step in the Right Direction: How Kansas v. Limon Indicates a
Brighter Future for Gay Rights Under Lawrence v. Texas, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 217, 240
(2006).
104. Wendy Koch, States Ease Laws That Punish Teens for Sex with Underage Partners, USA
TODAY, July 25, 2007, at Al.
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offenders [an individual offender falls under] and what information
[regarding these offenders] must be made available to the public."105
It does not affect the state's authority to criminalize status offend-
ers. 106 Therefore, states are still free to maintain their existing regis-
tration and notification requirements, even if they do not exempt teen
status offenders. Currently, at least twenty-nine states require regis-
tration in certain situations for consensual sex between teenagers.107
In addition, twenty states still lack any sort of age-gap provision in
their sex offender laws. 08 In five of those twenty states, the age of
consent is eighteen; thus, sex with anyone below eighteen constitutes a
criminal offense even if it was consensual.109
In the states that still criminalize consensual sexual activity between
teenagers, the statutory rape laws are not uniformly enforced against
such teens.110 Given the statistics showing the prevalence of sexual
activity among teens today,"' only a small fraction of these teens will
105. See Rogers, supra note 86, at 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 16911(5)(C).
106. See Young, supra note 8, at 465.
107. See No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 39-40 (noting that the twenty-nine states that
require teenagers to register as sex offenders for engaging in consensual sex are Alabama, ALA.
CODE § 13A-6-63, -11-200 (2008); Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.41.434, 12.63.010 (2010); Ari-
zona, ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-1405 (2007); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 12-12-903, 5-14-110
(2006); Colorado, COLo. REV. STAT. §§ 16-22-03, 18-3-402 (2006 & 2008); Connecticut, CONN.
GEN. STAT. §H 54-250, 54-251, 53a-70 (2007 & 2009); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.21, 794.011
(2010); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 11-8-8-7, 11-8-8-5 (2003); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:542, 15:541, 14:92(A)(7) (2001 & 2004); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-A, §§ 11222,
11203 (2006), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 254 (2010); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
PROC. §§ 11-704, 11-701, 3-308 (LexisNexis 2008); Massachusetts, MAsS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 6,
§ 178C, 178D (2006), GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 35A (2000); Michigan, MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 28.723,
28.722, 750.520e (2004); Minnesota, MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 243.166, 609.345 (2009 & 2010); Mis-
souri, Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 589.400, 566.032 (1999 & 2003); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 651-B:1, 651-B:2, 632-A:2 (2007); New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:14-2, 2C:7-2,
2C:14-3b (West 2005); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-208.7, 14-208.6, 14-27.7A (2000);
North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-15, 12.1-20-07 (1997); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit.
57, § 582 (2002), OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1123 (2004); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-37.1-3,
11-37.1-2 (2002); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-430 (2007 & Supp. 2010), §16-3-655
(2003); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-24B-2, 22-24B-1, 22-22-7 (1998); Tennessee,
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-39-202, 40-39-203, 39-13-506 (2010); Texas, TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. art. 62.002, 62.001 (Vernon 2010); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-27-21.5, 76-5-401, 76-5-
401.2 (2008); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.130, 9A.44.096 (2009); West Virginia, W.
VA. CODE §§ 15-12-2, 61-8B-9 (2009 & 2010); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. §§ 301.45, 948.02 (2005)).
108. As of 2009, twenty states still had yet to implement age-gap provisions in their sex of-
fender laws, which would no longer classify consensual sex between two teens close in age as
criminal. AGE OF CONSENT CHART FOR THE U.S.-2010, http://ageofconsent.us/ (last visited
Feb. 12, 2011); see also Pollet, supra note 15, at 4 (explaining that eleven states still lack any form
of Romeo and Juliet exception for consensual teenage sex).
109. See AGE OF CONSENT CHART, supra note 108.
110. See Pollet, supra note 15, at 4.
111. See TRENDS IN PREVALENCE OF SEXUAL BEHAVIORS, supra note 34 (finding that as of
2009 46% of high school students had sexual intercourse).
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ever actually face prosecution due to lack of time and resources in the
criminal justice system.112 Determining which teens to prosecute
often revolves around who brings these cases to the attention of law
enforcement agencies-typically parents and welfare officials." 3
Thus, scholars fear that the lack of uniformity in enforcement subjects
those teens who are targeted to disproportionate treatment.114
D. Past Supreme Court Constitutional Challenges
to Sex Offender Laws
In the decade-and-a-half following the advent and subsequent ex-
plosion of sex offender legislation in the United States, the Supreme
Court has only granted certiorari in two cases regarding constitutional
challenges to aspects of such legislation."i5 Most notable of these is
the 2003 case Smith v. Doe." 6 In Smith, the two male respondents
were convicted of sexual abuse of a minor-an aggravated sex of-
fense-and entered nolo contendere pleas." 7 Although both men
were convicted prior to the passage of Alaska's Sex Offender Regis-
tration Act (the Alaska Act), the provisions of the Alaska Act retro-
actively applied to them-requiring initial registration as a sex
offender, quarterly verifications of the men's locations, and notifica-
tion of any changes.18 The two men challenged the Alaska Act under
the Ex Post Facto Clausell 9 and the Due Process Clause.120 The Su-
112. Meredith Cohen, Comment, No Child Left Behind Bars: The Need to Combat Cruel and
Unusual Punishment of State Statutory Rape Laws, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 717, 732-33 (2008); see also
Kay L. Levine, The New Prosecution, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1125, 1183 (2005) (noting that
"handling statutory rape cases is not prized or valued within the district attorney's office or by
the criminal bar generally" and "[t]ime and resources spent on problem-solving approaches to an
unimportant crime do not make a prosecutor look like a real prosecutor to her colleagues").
113. See Sutherland, supra note 98, at 322; see also SHARON G. ELSTEIN & Noy DAVIS, SEX-
UAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ADULT MALES AND YOUNG TEEN GIRLS: EXPLORING THE LE-
GAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSES 26 (1997).
114. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 112, at 733.
115. Corey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 369, 373 (2009); see Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 3-6 (2003) (rejecting a
Due Process Clause challenge arguing that an alleged sex offender was not afforded a
predeprivation hearing under Connecticut's sex offender registry restrictions and holding that
there was no procedural due process violation because the alleged offender would receive the
proper procedural protections at the time of his actual trial and sentencing).
116. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
117. Id. at 91.
118. Id.
119. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28 (1981)
("The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law 'which
imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed; or
imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed."' (quoting Cummings v. Meeks, 71 U.S.
277, 278 (1867)).
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preme Court granted certiorari to resolve a disagreement between the
U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska and the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals concerning whether "the effects of the Act were
punitive despite the legislature's intent"-and thus, violative of the Ex
Post Facto Clause. 121
Noting that prior to this case, the Court had never "considered a
claim that a sex offender registration and notification law constitut[ed]
retroactive punishment forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause," the
Court began by determining whether the Alaska Act was civil or crim-
inal in nature. 122 Dispelling the importance of the fact that part of the
Alaska Act was codified in the state's criminal code, the Court sided
with the district court and concluded that "[bly contemplating 'dis-
tinctly civil procedures,' the legislature 'indicate[d] clearly that it in-
tended a civil, not a criminal sanction."'1 23 It is worth mentioning that
in 2003 when the Smith decision was released, sex offender laws, both
state and federal, were indisputably less severe than they are today-
in both force and scope. But with the creation of federally mandated
minimum standards for state registries, the passage of the Adam
Walsh Act in 2006 began the new era of sex offender laws.
Consequently, in the almost seven years that have passed since the
Smith decision, states have not sat idle, blindly accepting the Supreme
Court's reasoning. Instead, state and federal courts alike have begun
to not just call into question the validity of such reasoning, but some
have outright ruled against it. In October 2007, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Utah held that "SORNA [had] increased the
federal punishment for failing to register as a sex offender" and that
"[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not permit such increased criminal
penalties to be applied retroactively." 2 4 Similarly, in June 2008, the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas noted that in
Smith, the "Supreme Court did not determine whether prosecution of
retroactively applied registration requirements, which impose criminal
penalties, violate the ex post facto clause." 125 The court continued by
finding that the provision of SORNA that has the potential to subject
a defendant to criminal punishment for his actions that were legal at
the time the defendant performed them is in violation of "the ex post
facto clause because it results in enhanced punishment for conduct
120. Smith, 538 U.S. at 91; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
121. Smith, 538 U.S. at 92.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 96 (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267,
289 (1996)).
124. United States v. Gill, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1341, 1349 (D. Utah 2007).
125. United States v. Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d 561, 569 (W.D. Tex. 2008).
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that predates the time SORNA was applied to [the defendant]." 126
Finally, in August 2009, the Indiana Supreme Court held that "the
Indiana Sex Offender Registration Act ... violates the prohibition on
ex post facto laws . . . because it imposes burdens that have the effect
of adding punishment beyond that which could have been imposed
when [the] crime was committed." 127
The three previous cases mentioned all have one thing in common.
Each opinion recognized that, unlike the Supreme Court's holding in
Smith, registering as a sex offender-and the criminal consequences
that may follow-is a form of punishment.128 In addition, in Novem-
ber 2009, a Michigan appellate court indirectly answered the question
of whether sex offender registration and notification laws could be
considered a form of punishment by holding that its application to a
teenager convicted of engaging in consensual sex with his below-the-
age-of-consent girlfriend violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment.129
E. Evolution of the Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel
and Unusual Punishment
"The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man."' 30
The protective intent behind the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution existed over a century before the formal adoption of the
Bill of Rights.131 In general, the Eighth Amendment provides that,
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."132 This prohibition ap-
plies through the Fourteenth Amendment to the states.133 This right
to protection against excessive punishments derives from the idea that
126. Id. at 570.
127. Wallace v. State, 905 N.E.2d 371, 384 (Ind. 2009).
128. See Natividad-Garcia, 560 F. Supp. 2d at 569-70; Gill, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1349; Wallace,
905 N.E.2d at 384.
129. People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009); see infra notes 171-87
and accompanying text.
130. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion).
131. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966 (1991) ("[Tlhe entire text of the Eighth
Amendment is taken almost verbatim from the English Declaration of Rights, which provided
'[t]hat excessive Baile ought not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and
unusuall Punishments inflicted."' (second alteration in original)).
132. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
133. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("'[T]he privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States' as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment in-
cluded protection against 'cruel and unusual punishments . . . .' (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV)).
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punishment should be proportional to the offense.134 However, the
Court does not often recognize "successful proportionality challenges
outside the context of capital punishment." 1 3 5 In fact, in Harmelin v.
Michigan,136 the Court found that the use of the Eighth Amendment
to find non-capital punishment unconstitutional is "exceedingly
rare. "137
Nonetheless, in 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ewing v. Califor-
nia138 extended the proportionality principle to a non-capital case in-
volving California's "three strikes" statute that carried with it a
mandatory sentence of twenty-five years to life. 139 The Supreme
Court weighs the following factors-to be discussed in greater detail
in this Comment's analysisl 40-when determining whether a particu-
lar penalty is disproportionate: (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) the
harshness of the penalty in comparison to the offense, (3) the penal-
ties for other criminals in the state, and (4) the penalties in other
states for the same offense. 141 In addition, for the past half-century,
the Supreme Court has recognized that "the laws of other countries
... [are] instructive for its interpretation of the Eighth amendment's
prohibition of 'cruel and unusual punishments. "1 42 Thus, while a
comparison of the laws of other countries may not receive equal
134. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).
135. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 963.
136. Id. at 957.
137. Id. at 963 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980)).
138. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
139. Id. at 28-31.
140. See infra notes 192-279 and accompanying text.
141. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 22 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983)).
142. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575, 576 (2005) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
102-03 (1958)) (conceding the significance of "Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on
the Rights of the Child, which every country in the world has ratified save for the United States
and Somalia" because it "contains an express prohibition on capital punishment for crimes com-
mitted by juveniles under 18"); see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002)
("[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved."); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988) (noting the abolition of the juvenile death penalty "by other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western
European community," and observing that "[wle have previously recognized the relevance of
the views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual"); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982) ("[T]he doctrine of felony mur-
der has been abolished in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of
other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in continental Europe."); Coker v. Georgia,
433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977) ("It is ... not irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the
world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue.");
Trop, 356 U.S. at 102-03 ("The civilized nations of the world [were] in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for crime.").
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weight to the individual factors, the Court does look to such laws-or
lack thereof-for confirmation in its intended decision.143
While weighing the factors, the Court accepted the rationale behind
Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin'44-finding that "in deter-
mining unconstitutional disproportionality, 'no one factor [is] disposi-
tive in a given case"' and "one factor may be sufficient to determine
the constitutionality of a particular sentence." 145 Thus, "[a] better
reading . . . leads to the conclusion that intrajurisdictional and in-
terjurisdictional analyses are appropriate ... [after] a threshold com-
parison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an
inference of gross disproportionality." 46
In instances where a comparative analysis is necessary, the Court
has looked to the public's current attitude toward a given offense in
order to inform their application of the Eighth Amendment. 147 The
Court has continuously recognized that what may qualify as "cruel
and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment changes with
the times.148 Since 1910,149 the Supreme Court has recognized that, in
regards to the Eighth Amendment, the words shall be construed illus-
tratively, not precisely, and the scope shall be adaptable to the current
times, not static.150 In addition, the Eighth Amendment "must be in-
terpreted according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and
precedent."151 The Court has found that "an assessment of contempo-
rary values concerning the infliction of a challenged punishment is rel-
evant to the application of the Eighth Amendment." 152 Thus, the
amendment "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society."153
143. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
144. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
145. Id. (quoting Solem, 463 U.S. at 291 n.17); see also Ewing, 538 U.S. at 24.
146. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that only after first finding
an inference of gross disproportionality between the offense committed and the penalty imposed
does it become important to conduct a comparative analysis to determine if the penalty is in fact
grossly excessive for the offense committed); see also id. ("The proper role for comparative anal-
ysis of [penalties], then, is to validate an initial judgment that a [penalty] is grossly disproportion-
ate to [the offense]." (emphasis added)).
147. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370 (1989).
148. See Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court's Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Severe
Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 795 (2009).
149. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) ("The clause of the Constitution ...
may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
150. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion).
151. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
152. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
153. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (emphasis added).
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The Court's inquiry into our society's "evolving standards of de-
cency" 154 takes into account "objective indicia of consensus, as ex-
pressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have
addressed the question." 55 Therefore, to determine whether there is
a national consensus, the Supreme Court looks to the number of
states that have already rejected a certain punishment or sanction, the
consistency of the direction of change, and the infrequency of its use
in states where the punishment remains permissible. 5 6 In situations
where society has spoken and an apparent consensus exists, the Su-
preme Court stresses that it merely asks "whether there is a reason to
disagree with the judgment reached by [society] and its legislators"157
because under the Eighth Amendment, society's views cannot be sub-
stituted for those of the Court.1 58
Finally, and in addition to the analysis of whether a punishment is
cruel and unusual, the Eighth Amendment demands more than simply
weighing factors to determine if "a challenged punishment [is] accept-
154. Id.
155. Roper, 543 U.S. at 563-64.
156. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008) (finding that because only six of the
thirty-seven jurisdictions that authorize the death penalty permit the execution of child rapists, a
national consensus existed to bar the use of child rape as a capital offense under the Eighth
Amendment); Roper, 543 U.S. at 551 (concluding that there was enough evidence to support a
national consensus against juvenile executions because a majority of states rejected the imposi-
tion of capital punishment on juveniles and in those states still lacking a formal prohibition on
the matter, the practice was so infrequent that in the previous ten years only three juveniles had
been executed); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313-16 (2002) (finding that a national consen-
sus against executing mentally retarded persons could be found from the large number of states
already prohibiting such executions, the complete absence of states passing legislation to rein-
state the power to conduct such executions, and the state legislatures that have recently ad-
dressed this issue voting overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 332-35 (1989) (finding that the existence of only two states prohibiting the execution of the
mentally retarded, even including the fourteen states that prohibit the death penalty outright,
did not provide sufficient evidence of national consensus against executing mentally retarded
defendants); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-71 (1989) (concluding that a national con-
sensus could not be found to set a minimum age of eighteen for executions when only fifteen out
of the thirty-seven states permitting capital punishment declined to impose it on sixteen year
olds and only twelve declined to impose it on seventeen year olds); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815, 826-30 (1988) (concluding that evidence of fourteen states not authorizing capital pun-
ishment at all and eighteen of the states that allow it setting a minimum age of at least sixteen
created the presumption that there was a national consensus against executing juveniles below
the age of sixteen); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408-10 (1986) (finding that because
twenty-six out of the forty-one states that had death penalty statutes explicitly prohibited the
execution of persons meeting the test for legal incompetence demonstrated a national consensus
that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing the insane); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593
(1977) (finding that because at no time in the previous fifty years had a majority of states author-
ized the death penalty as a punishment for rape without murder resulting, there was a national
consensus against executions for the crime of rape of an adult woman).
157. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
158. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.
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able to contemporary society."159 The punishment must also serve
one of the penological justifications in order to prevent the "gratui-
tous infliction of suffering."160 A specific punishment will be deemed
constitutional so long as it advances the goal of deterrence, retribu-
tion, or rehabilitation.161 The goal of deterrence revolves around
whether a particular punishment is proportional to the extent that fear
of the punishment will "deter" individuals from committing such an
offense. 162 Unlike deterrence, for retribution the focus is not on the
individual offender but rather on society.163 In fashioning a punish-
ment, the Court addresses "society's moral outrage at particularly of-
fensive conduct"164 and punishes based on the notion that the
individual therefore deserves it.165 Finally, with the goal of rehabilita-
tion, the Court "presupposes a degree of free will, in that people must
be able to reform their behavior so as to conform to the criminal law
and quash recidivistic tendencies."1 66 Rehabilitation serves dual
goals: preventing the offender from re-offending and protecting the
public against such offenses.167
As a result of the entire proportionality analysis, the Court admits
that it often defers to the judgments of the state legislatures that have
already spoken on the matter.168 However, in Solem v. Helm,169 the
Court made clear that "no penalty is per se constitutional."170
F. People v. Dipiazza and the Eighth Amendment
In November 2009, a Michigan appellate court rendered a decision
that will likely have a major impact on the constitutionality of sex of-
fender laws as applied to consenting teenagers' 7 1-a decision that the
young defendant's lawyer hailed to be "a victory for common
159. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976).
160. Id. at 183.
161. See Russell G. Murphy & Eric J. Carlson, "Like Snow [Falling] on a Branch . . ": Inter-
national Law Influences on Death Penalty Decisions and Debates in the United States, 38 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 115, 116-17 (2009).
162. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571-72 (2005).
163. See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 517-18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183 (plurality opinion).
165. Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 80 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring).
166. Stephen O'Hanlon, Towards a More Reasonable Approach to Free Will in Criminal Law,
7 CARDOZO PuB. L. POL'Y & Ermics J. 395, 419 (2008).
167. See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 601-03 (9th Cir. 2004).
168. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Dawson Bell, Court: Sex Offender Registry Law Is Cruel to Young Lovers, DETROrr
FREE PREss, Nov. 5, 2009, at A6; see also People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 274 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2009).
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sense." 172 The story originated as an unremarkable high school love
story: senior boy falls for freshman girl.' 7 3 However, unlike most high
school relationships, this story differs in two major respects. For one,
the relationship surpassed the typical expiration date that plagues
most young relationships. 74 After over five years together, the
couple is now happily married with a child.175 Second, and more im-
portantly, the actions of this otherwise devoted husband and father
during his senior year landed him on the Michigan sex offender
registry.176
Robert Dipiazza began dating Nanette Trowbridge in 2004.177
Nanette's parents knew of the relationship and condoned it.178 All
appeared normal until Nanette's teacher discovered a photograph of
her and Robert in bed together with his hand placed on her breast.179
The age of consent in Michigan is sixteen. 80 Thus, because at the
time Robert was eighteen and Nanette was weeks shy of her fifteenth
birthday, the teacher notified the prosecuting attorney.' 8' In August
of 2004, Robert "was adjudicated under the Holmes Youthful Trainee
Act . . . for attempted third-degree criminal sexual conduct" and was
sentenced to probation-in addition to being required to register as a
sex offender.182 After successfully completing his probation the fol-
lowing year, the trial court effectively dismissed Robert's case-leav-
172. Troy Reimink, Are Sex-Offender Laws in Need of Reform?, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS ON-
LINE (Nov. 6, 2009, 12:25 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/index.ssf/2009/11/are
sex-offender laws in-need.html (quoting the defendant's attorney).
173. Man Wins Appeal; Name off Sex Registry, WooD TV (Nov. 4, 2009, 8:09 PM), http://
www.woodtv.com/dpp/news/local/muskegon-county/Man-wins-appeal-to-have-name-off-sex_
registry.
174. See Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 273.
175. Id.; Brian Dickerson, Op-Ed., Don't Count Romeo as a Sex Offender, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Nov. 5, 2009, at A2.
176. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 266.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 273.
179. Id. at 266.
180. See Doug Guthrie, Ruling Could Shorten Sex Offender List, DETROIT NEWS, Nov. 5,
2009, at 4A.
181. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 266.
182. Id.
[The Holmes Youthful Trainee Act] is essentially a juvenile diversion program for
criminal defendants under the age of 21.. . . An assignment to the youthful trainee
status does not constitute a conviction of a crime unless the court revokes the defen-
dant's status as a youthful trainee. If the defendant's status is not revoked and the
defendant successfully completes his or her status as youthful trainee, the court "shall
discharge the individual and dismiss the proceedings."
Id. at 266-67 (citations omitted).
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ing no record of conviction.183 Michigan still required Robert to
register as an offender. 184
On appeal, Robert's attorney argued that "the financial and emo-
tional consequences of requiring him to register [had] been devastat-
ing and thus requiring him to register as a sex offender, under the
circumstances of this case, should be deemed [cruel and unusual] pun-
ishment." 8 5 The appellate court, "after considering the gravity of the
offense, the harshness of the penalty, a comparison of the penalty to
penalties imposed for the same offense in other states, and the goal of
rehabilitation," agreed with Robert's attorney and concluded that re-
quiring Robert to register as a sex offender was a form of cruel and
unusual punishment. 8 6 Then, in April 2011, Michigan's Governor
Rick Snyder signed into law a provision that will "allow some older
offenders-especially those who can satisfy the court that their under-
age sex partners were not coerced-to be removed from the list, or
escape registration altogether."' 8 7
Though Robert's five-year plight in search of justice is only one of
thousands across the country, it still exposes the inadvertent "catch-
all" effect that sex offender laws have and the resulting need for re-
form. 88 In reality, considering the statistics surrounding the high
levels of sexual activity among teenagers-no matter how idealistic
statutory mandates that bar certain circumstances of teenage sexual
intimacy are-they are inevitably impractical.189 Nonetheless, that is
exactly what occurs when a state's sex offender law applies to teenag-
ers engaging in consensual sex with one another.190 Moreover, across
183. Id. at 266.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 273 (noting that because of Robert's status as a registered sex offender, he was
unable to hold a job for more than a few days, forced to live on food stamps, and fell into a
serious depression).
186. Id. at 274; see also Bill Gives Break to Consenting Teens, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 25, 2011,
at A15 (noting that the Michigan House and Senate recently passed a "new law [that] will pre-
vent kids from ending up on the sex offender registry if they had consensual sex with a partner
between 13 and 16 years old, provided there is no more than four years between their ages").
187. Brian Dickerson, Sex Law Change Too Late for Some, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 17,
2011, at Al.
188. Reimink, supra note 172; see also Don Corbett, Let's Talk About Sext: The Challenge of
Finding the Right Legal Response to the Teenage Practice of "Sexting," 13 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3-4
(2009) (discussing the recent phenomenon of teenagers sending nude or partially nude photos of
themselves via text messaging-"sexting"-and how there are states actively charging these
teenagers with transmitting child pornography and requiring them to register as sex offenders).
189. Accord Cohen, supra note 112, at 723.
190. See id. at 733.
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the states and at the federal level, there is still no uniform approach to
addressing this issue.191
III. ANALYSIS
When someone hears the word "pedophile," pictures of past con-
victed rapists and murderers come to mind.192 Thanks in part to de-
voted media attention, the ability to immediately conjure up images of
men similar to Elizabeth Smart's and Jaycee Lee Dugard's captors has
become an inherent reflex of society.193 Society has a justifiable dis-
dain for rapists and pedophiles.194 But what are society's thoughts
about a senior boy dating a freshman girl? Most probably would not
bat an eye-rather, the notion that "they're teens and they're in
love!" might dictate their reactions. Alternatively, consider a slightly
different scenario: the senior boy is still dating the freshman girl, but
now the two are engaging in consensual sex with one another. This
fact might change people's feelings. Regardless of whether people
morally disagree with two teenagers having premarital sex, would they
maintain it is worth classifying the older teenager as a sex offender on
par with pedophiles and aggravated rapists?
Thus, this Part analyzes not simply whether applying the sex of-
fender laws to a teenager convicted of engaging in consensual sex with
another teenager below the age of consent is wrong, but also whether
such application violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.
A. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws as Applied to
Teens Engaging in Consensual Sex Violates
the Eighth Amendment
In agreement with the Michigan appellate court,195 the classification
as sex offenders of teenagers who engaged in consensual sex with
other teenagers close in age violates the Eighth Amendment's prohi-
bition against cruel and unusual punishments. To be discussed in fur-
ther detail below, determining whether a punishment is cruel or
191. See id. ("Just as the enforcement of statutory rape laws differs among states, so too does
the label for the crime that is attached to acts of consensual teenage sex.").
192. See JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF PROTECTING CHILDREN
FROM SEx 22 (2002).
193. See id. at 21-23 (discussing the role the media has played in fueling societal fear of and
revulsion to pedophiles).
194. Id. at 26 (noting that "there may be nothing fundamental about a person that makes him
a 'pedophile"' and that "[o]ur culture fears the pedophile ... not because he is a deviant, but
because he is ordinary").
195. See supra notes 171-86 and accompanying text.
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unusual requires consideration of (1) the gravity of the offense in
question; (2) the harshness of the penalty imposed for such offense;
(3) a comparison of the penalty imposed in the instant case versus
penalties imposed for other crimes in the state; and (4) a comparison
of the penalty imposed in the instant case versus penalties imposed for
the same offense in other states.196 In addition, courts historically are
willing to look for guidance to the approaches other nations are taking
concerning the same matter.197 The outcome of each of these factors
as applied to requiring a teenager to register as a sex offender then
will be weighed to determine if the punishment (registering as a sex
offender) is grossly disproportionate to the offense (having consensual
sex with another teenager). 198 Therefore, the remainder of this Sec-
tion will look at each factor individually and its application to the teen
sex offender, as well as whether the punishment of registering as a sex
offender serves any of the three penological justifications, including
deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.
1. Because the Offense of Consensual Sex Among Teenagers Is Not
Grave, Classifying Such Teenagers as "Sex Offenders"
Violates the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
"Minors' premarital sexual experimentation ... is not a new phe-
nomenon . . . ."199
In the Eighth Amendment analysis, the first factor to be considered
is the gravity of the offense compared to the punishment imposed for
the offense. When it comes to consensual sex, "the circumstances of
the offense are not very grave." 200 While people may not agree with
the idea of an eighteen-year-old photographing himself in bed with a
near fifteen-year-old, the circumstances underlying the photograph-
sexual acts among teenagers-are by no means unique or unprece-
dented.201 No matter how taboo the topic of sex may be, it is gener-
ally a very recognized aspect of life,202 including teenage life.2 0 3
196. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962 (1991).
197. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 & n.31 (1988).
198. See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962-64.
199. Dana M. Northcraft, A Nation Scared: Children, Sex, and the Denial of Humanity, 12 AM.
U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y & L. 483, 489 (2004) (reviewing LEVINE, supra note 192).
200. People v. Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d 264, 273 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009).
201. See Sharon Jayson, In Tech Flirting, Decorum Optional, USA TODAY, Dec. 10, 2008, at
1A; see aslo Cohen, supra note 112, at 723 ("Although some people believe that teenage sex is
immoral, the public's view on morality should not be a component in determining the scope of
the laws.").
202. Seventy percent of television shows involve some form of sexual content. Dianne Lu,
Op-Ed., Getting Real with Sex Education, BosToN GLOBE, Dec. 27, 2007, at 11A.
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There is an evident difference between attempts to protect mi-
nors-or those under the relevant age of consent-from exploitive
and predatory sexual relationships, and attempts to prevent teenagers
from engaging in sex at all. Thus, in cases involving consensual sex
among teenagers relatively close in age, it is difficult to classify the
actual act of sex as rape and the elder teen as a "sex offender." 204 For
instance, as the appellate court reasoned in Dipiazza, the "[d]efendant
was 18 years old and in a consensual sexual relationship with another
teen who was almost 15 years old. The other teen's parents knew of
the relationship and condoned it. This other teen is the same person
[the] defendant married five years later." 205 Granted, this is not al-
ways the case-and in fact in most situations, it is the exact opposite.
For the more common scenario, replace the parents' blessing with the
parents informing local law enforcement of the relationship, as well as
the "happily ever after" marital bliss with the relationship ending
quickly in typical teenage fashion. However, it is not the parents'
blessing or the happily-ever-after, fairy-tale image that lessens the
gravity of the offense. It is the nature of the offense itself: consensual
sex.
For the rest of society falling above the age of consent and engaging
in intimate relations with another also above the age of consent, con-
sensual sex is not only not criminalized, it is a cornerstone of our cul-
ture.206 Sex is celebrated and embraced.207 Society itself is changing
and thus society's views on sex have also changed as a result.208 In
203. Susan Salter Reynolds, Sex, Sex, Sex, Sex, Sex ... Perplexed, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2008, at
R10 ("Bottom line: Sex is a good thing, and worth fighting for.").
204. See Dipiazza, 778 N.W.2d at 273.
205. Id.
206. See Peter Tatchell, Don't Criminalise Young Sex, GUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 24, 2009, 9:00
PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/sep/24/sex-under-16-under
age.
Providing it is safe and with consent, sex is good. It is not dirty, shameful or damag-
ing. It is an immensely pleasurable and profound human bond, which involves intense
shared fulfillment and happiness. Consensual sex should not be stimagti[z]ed or
criminali[z]ed, not for young people, not for adults, not for anyone.
Id.
207. See Alexandra Jacobs, Campus Exposure, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2007 (Magazine), at 44, 44
("Sex is everywhere, and it's always been everywhere for this generation." (internal quotations
omitted)).
208. See Heather D. Boonstra, Young People Need Help in Preventing Pregnancy and HIV;
How Will the World Respond?, 10 GUrrMACHER POL'Y REV. 2, 2 (2007). For further evidence
that society's views on sex have changed, see Jacques Steinberg, Extracurricular Sex Toy Lesson
Draws Rebuke at Northwestern, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2011, at A13 (discussing a Northwestern
University "psychology professor's decision to present his students . . . with a demonstration
outside class that featured a couple engaging in a live sex act using a prop" as part of a Human
Sexuality course).
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reality, women are much more likely to go into the workforce and
have a career today than they were twenty, thirty, or forty-plus years
ago.2 09 With the majority of women choosing to have a career outside
of the home, these same women also choose to get married and start a
family later in life than in prior decades.210 What this means is that
"inevitably, postponing marriage has meant that sex before marriage
has become more common."211 In addition, the very definition of ad-
olescence involves recognized "physiological and psychological matu-
ration." 212 At this stage in teenagers' lives, sexual expression towards
one another is not only a natural response, but also a "developmen-
tally appropriate" response.213
In sum, if sex among teenagers is not only a common part of our
society but also something that is recognized as being natural and de-
velopmentally appropriate for these teenagers, it is clear that the na-
ture of the offense is greatly lacking in gravity. While admittedly
capital punishment or a harsh prison sentence are two of the gravest
punishments the government can impose on an individual, requiring
someone to register as a sex offender still carries with it gravity unlike
most other forms of punishment. Therefore, the gravity of the offense
is grossly disproportional to the punishment imposed.
2. Because the Stigma Following One's Designation as a Sex
Offender Lasts a Lifetime, the Harshness of the Penalty
Violates the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against
Cruel and Unusual Punishments
"[T]hose labeled 'sex offenders' are 'marked for life."' 214
The second fact to be considered in Eighth Amendment analysis is
the harshness of the penalty. The harshness of the penalty looks at
the negative effects that result from the penalty to determine whether
the penalty is grossly disproportional-and thus violative of the
Eighth Amendment-to the charged offense. Here, the effects of the
punishment last a lifetime. As one writer so cleverly put it:
209. See Boonstra, supra note 208, at 2.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Cynthia Dailard, Legislating Against Arousal: The Growing Divide Between Federal Pol-
icy and Teenage Sexual Behavior, 9 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 12, 13 (2006).
213. Id.; see also Oberman, supra note 100, at 704 ("[T]o a certain extent adolescent sexual
behavior is usual and expected, and perhaps even part of healthy growth and development.").
214. Shawndra Jones, Note, Setting Their Record Straight: Granting Wrongly Branded Individ-
uals Relief from Sex Offender Registration, 41 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 479, 499 (2008) (quot-
ing Megan's Law: A Scarlet Letter, EcoNoMisT, Nov. 14, 2002).
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If Romeo and Juliet survived Act V, they would have been wrong to
think they'd reached a happy ending. Romeo wouldn't have been
able to take his kids to school or parks-including Bears games,
forest preserves and the lakefront-and other parents might well
tell their children to shun the Montague household, knowing a reg-
istered sex offender lived there.215
The reality is, the label "sex offender" "carr[ies] with it shame, humili-
ation, ostracism, loss of employment and decreased opportunities for
employment, perhaps even physical violence, and a multitude of other
adverse consequences." 2 16 Nonetheless, the overarching rationale be-
hind sex offender registration does not constitute an excessive pen-
alty.2 1 7 However, when one considers the circumstances of the
offense for which the penalty is being imposed-it may become exces-
sive. Requiring a teenager to register as a sex offender forever brands
the teenager as a member of the same group as horrific rapists and
pedophiles. The metaphoric "scum of the earth" 218 thus includes this
otherwise law-abiding, innocent teen.
Considering the legal consequences that attach to sex offender re-
gistration, the harshness of such requirements drastically restricts
where an offender can live, work, and travel. To begin, the penalty of
requiring a teenager to register as a sex offender is harsh because the
registration requirements last forever. This means that the legal con-
sequences simply do not end when the teenager is forced to register as
an offender-if anything, they have just begun.219 He must continue
to abide by the relevant state's sex offender laws and re-register when-
ever he travels to other states.220 In addition, over twenty states and
hundreds of cities and towns have already enacted residency restric-
tion laws.2 2 1 Of these individual residency restrictions, the majorities
of ordinances "do not require or ensure the individualized assessment
of offenders to determine their likelihood to reoffend and their true
215. Take Romeo off Sex Offender List, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 28, 2011, at 21.
216. Doe v. Pataki, 3 F. Supp. 2d 456, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
217. See Dallas, supra note 91, at 1238 (commenting that "[b]ecause of the significant interest
in protecting children from the perpetrators of sexual crime, [sex offender laws] are viewed as a
legitimate means of effecting important public policy" and "[t]o argue that all sex offender legis-
lation should be wholly repealed is, at the very least, imprudent").
218. Sandra Pedicini, Spotlight: Clustered Lives of Sex Offenders, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov.
29, 2008, at B1 (discussing a documentary film in which "[tihe title [Scum of the Earth], meant as
irony, sums up society's view of sex offenders").
219. See Cohen, supra note 112, at 740-42. "One consequence of community notification is
that as these teenagers become adults, 'they may struggle to stay in the mainstream"' and "they
'find themselves subject to the shame and stigma of being identified as sex offenders . . . for the
rest of their lives."' Id. (quoting No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 66).
220. Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registra-
tion Laws, 86 B.U. L. REV. 295, 332-33 (2006).
221. Catherine Elton, Behind the Picket, BosToN GLOBE, May 6, 2007, at 34.
2011] 1199
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
danger to the public."222 Thus, this seemingly harmless teenage of--
fender is drastically limited in the area in which he can live, work, and
travel.223
In addition, many residency restrictions prevent these teenagers
from finishing high school. Take for example the case of Ricky
Blackman.224 When Ricky was sixteen, he met a girl at an Iowa night-
club for teenagers. 225 After hitting it off and believing her to be fif-
teen, Ricky and the girl began dating.226 However, police later
determined the girl was only thirteen.227 After pleading guilty to the
crime of sexual abuse, Ricky had to register as a sex offender. 228 And
because of his recently acquired status as a sex offender, the high
school denied Ricky enrollment because "he was considered a danger
to the rest of the students."229 In addition, "[h]e couldn't take GED
classes at the vocational school in town because of an on-campus day
care center" that would have put Ricky in direct violation of local
residency restrictions that prevented him from being within a certain
distance of children. 230
Considering all the barriers that prevent these teenagers from re-
ceiving a high school education-the scope of jobs that these teenag-
ers would be qualified for is greatly diminished.231 Moreover, with job
opportunities already severely limited, the teenager will continue to
find it nearly impossible to acquire and maintain suitable employment
once his employer discovers his sex offender status. 232 Thus, any work
that can be found and maintained will likely be low-end, minimum
wage work with no future prospects.233
In addition to the legal consequences that drastically restrict the of-
fender's ability to live, work, and travel, the penalty of requiring a
222. Asmara Tekle-Johnson, In the Zone: Sex Offenders and the Ten-Percent Solutions, 94
IOWA L. REV. 607, 619-20 (2009).
223. Sarah E. Agudo, Comment, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy of
Sex Offender Residency Laws, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 313 (2008) ("[W]hen the residency laws
are so severe that they force the offender to move to destitute or remote locations . . . [it]
threatens or eliminates the offender's ability to maintain a family, uphold a job, and [freely]
move about the state and country.").
224. See Grinberg, supra note 78.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See Cohen, supra note 112, at 740-41.
232. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 214, at 499 ("[E]mployers are often not barred from refus-
ing employment 'solely on the basis' of a sex crime conviction.").
233. See Cohen, supra note 112, at 740.
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teenager to register as a sex offender is disproportionately harsh be-
cause of the stigmatization that follows the offender for the remainder
of his life. While residency restrictions physically ostracize an of-
fender, the stigma of being branded a "sex offender" psychologically
ostracizes that person from the rest of society.234 While not endorsing
the view himself, one commentator referred to convicted sex offend-
ers as a form of "human waste" and explained residency restrictions as
"waste management"-a reference different legislators have
adopted. 235 Thus, it is clear that the psychological and emotional
harm that results from legislation branding someone a sex offender is
irreparable. Sex offenders often attest to incidents involving vigilante
attacks against them based solely on their publicly known status as an
offender. Vigilantism should never be promoted. However, when
vigilante acts are directed at these teenagers-teenagers who are not
offenders and not threats or dangers to society-they seem particu-
larly egregious.
An excellent example of such an unwarranted and misguided attack
occurred on Easter Sunday 2006, when twenty-year-old Stephen Mar-
shall showed up at the home of twenty-four-year-old William Elliot, a
convicted sex offender, and executed him in cold blood.236 Prior to
the killing, Marshall had logged on to the Maine Sex Offender Regis-
try Web site to search for registered sex offenders in the area.2 37 Al-
though access to the Web site's data required users to register,
registration was free. 238 Once registered, users like Marshall were
privy to "photos, names, ages, addresses and conviction histories of
about 2,200 registered sex offenders in the state." 239 The months fol-
lowing Elliot's murder drew widespread commentary because of the
circumstances surrounding why Elliot originally had to register as a
sex offender. 240 When Elliot was nineteen, a Massachusetts trial court
convicted him of having sex with a girl below sixteen-the state's age
234. See id. at 742; see also Kristin K. Zinsmaster, Note, In Re the Welfare of Due Process, 94
MINN. L. REV. 168, 178-79 (2009) (noting that "[r]egardless of the policy rationale, placing a
juvenile's name on this public [sex] offender list is highly stigmatic" and that "the ramifications
of registration may be felt by the offender well into adulthood").
235. Tekle-Johnson, supra note 222, at 610.
236. Kimberly Atkins, Slayings Re-Ignite Debate over Posting Sex Offender Information On-
line, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 18, 2006, at 4 (reporting that Marshall also murdered registered sex
offender Joseph Lewis Gray that same day prior to shooting himself on a bus later that evening);
Emily Bazar, Website Led Shooter to Sex Offenders' Homes, USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 2006, at 5A.
237. Bazar, supra note 236, at 5A.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Editorial, Sex Offender Registry Policies Deserve Review, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD,
Apr. 29, 2006, at All.
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of consent. 2 41 However, the girl happened to be Elliot's girlfriend and
was only weeks shy of her sixteenth birthday.242
Elliot's harassment is no anomaly. Rather, it is common for regis-
tered sex offenders to face harassment due to their status. 243 Though
limited to the state of Kentucky, a recent study found that 47% of
registered sex offenders in that state experienced harassment in per-
son.244 And this sort of persecution has also been directed at sex of-
fenders' families via menacing "letters, phone calls, and in-person
visits telling them to move and/or threatening their lives." 245
In sum, the legal consequences of sex offender registration drasti-
cally limit these teenagers' ability to live, work, and travel. In addi-
tion, the emotional and psychological consequences that follow from
society's abhorrence of sex offenders leave these teenagers feeling os-
tracized and alone. Therefore, the harshness of sex offender registra-
tion for teenagers in these situations violates the Eighth Amendment.
3. Unlike Predetermined Sentences that Attach to Other Crimes,
Requiring a Person to Register as a Sex Offender Results in
Indeterminate Consequences that Follow and Limit the
Offender Throughout His Life
The third factor to be considered in the Eighth Amendment analy-
sis is the excessiveness of the penalty of registering as a sex offender
compared to the excessiveness of penalties imposed for other crimes
in the state. First, by simply comparing the penalty imposed for sex
between consenting teenagers and the penalties that follow from the
more vicious sex offenses such as child rape and molestations-it is
evident that most state statutes do not differentiate between the
"teenagers" and the "pedophiles" when it comes to the scope of sex
offender registration and notification laws. 2 4 6 As far as the public's
perception of a sex offender is concerned, a teenager convicted of
having consensual sex with his underage girlfriend may just as well
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Wayne A. Logan, Megan's Law as a Case Study in Political Stasis, 61 SYRACUSE L. REV.
371, 403 (2011); see also Joseph J. Fischel, Transcendent Homosexuals and Dangerous Sex Of-
fenders: Sexual Harm and Freedom in the Judicial Imaginary, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
277, 286 (2010) ("As a result of online notification, offenders are routinely harassed, publicly
humiliated, and assaulted, and homes of offenders have been burned down or otherwise
vandalized.").
244. Richard Tewksbury, Exile at Home: The Unintended Collateral Consequences of Sex Of-
fender Residency Restrictions, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 531, 532 (2007).
245. Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 735-36.
246. See Geer, supra note 99, at 45 (noting that "many states do not differentiate the danger-
ousness of registered juvenile sex offenders" from adults).
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have viciously raped a defenseless child because the public sees the
"sex offender"-not the specifics of the individual offenses.247 With
requiring a teenager to register as an offender, the punishment will
effectively haunt him throughout his adulthood. 248
For instance, residency restrictions as a form of punishment are
unique to sex offenders. 249 Unlike punishments for other crimes, the
legal scope of residency restrictions permits law enforcement agencies
to require a registered offender "to move to comply with the resi-
dency requirements" regardless of whether "the offender had estab-
lished residency prior to the enactment of the prohibition." 2 50  In
addition, while any sort of criminal record will affect an individual's
chance at employment where background checks are performed, sex
offender laws take it a step further. 251 Because residency restrictions
can limit where an offender can work, "several states have laws that
prohibit . . . working within a certain distance from 'schools, daycare
facilities, playgrounds, public swimming pools ... recreation centers,
or public athletic fields." 252 The problem is that laws such as this
have the added effect of prohibiting an offender from working a long
list of other jobs merely because they are located near a prohibited
place of employment.253
In addition to residency restrictions, many states are considering im-
plementing laws that would prevent all registered sex offenders-irre-
spective of their individual offenses-from having access to the
247. See Talk of the Nation with Neal Conan: Report Finds Fault in Sex Offender Laws (NPR
radio broadcast Sept. 18, 2007), available at http://www.wbur.org/npr/14505044/report-finds-
fault-in-sex-offender-laws (discussing how our current registry "is not limited to individuals that
have been individually assessed to actually pose a risk to the community," and thus society is left
to assume that all on the registry are violent pedophiles who pose serious risks).
248. See No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 78-79 ("Registered sex offenders face ostracism,
job loss, eviction or expulsion from their homes, and the dissolution of personal relationships.
They confront harassment, threats, and property damage. Some have endured vigilantism and
violence. A few have been killed. Many experience 'despair and hopelessness;' some have com-
mitted suicide.").
249. See Elton, supra note 221, at 34 ("[R]esidency laws bring up serious civil liberties con-
cerns, including that these measures apply to convicts after they have been punished.
(emphasis added)).
250. Carpenter, supra note 220, at 335.
251. See Geer, supra note 99, at 48.
252. Id. (quoting Joseph L. Lester, Off to Elba! The Legitimacy of Sex Offender Residence and
Employment Restrictions, 40 AKRON L. REV. 339, 354 (2007)).
253. See id. (recognizing that because sex offender restrictions set distances from where an
offender can legally work, the offender often must forgo taking certain jobs that may require
him to travel to numerous locations for fear that he will "inadvertently enter[] the restricted
zones").
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Internet, specifically social networking sites.254 For instance, in 2009,
the popular social networking site, MySpace, removed and then subse-
quently banned 90,000 of its users after finding out they were regis-
tered sex offenders. 255 Because of the KIDS Act of 2008,256 sites like
MySpace are immunized "from suits for banning persons registered
with the national sex offender database." 257 The effect that this law
and the subsequent actions taken by social networking sites will inevi-
tably have on these teenage sex offenders is overly drastic. Once
again, a law with seemingly good intentions is given an over-inclusive
reach, banning all registered offenders and not merely the most dan-
gerous ones. Therefore, in a society that revolves around the use of
technology to communicate-where e-mail is "in" and lettered mail is
archaic-a ban on the use of such technology permanently disadvan-
tages the teenage offender. And for a teenager who has yet to even
break into the career world, he now is not only limited from what
types of jobs he may hold and where he can legally live, but he is also
limited in his means of communicating.
So what other options does this teenage offender have? If the teen-
ager opts to not register-hoping he will be able to find suitable em-
ployment and residency-he subjects himself to severe criminal
penalties, including prison time, if he is caught.258 But what about, for
instance, drug dealers who face none of these restrictions? Does soci-
ety not care about where they are living and working or who they
have access to on the Internet? Therefore, unlike the punishments
imposed on the majority of other crimes, requiring these teenagers to
register as sex offenders disproportionately and unconstitutionally
punishes them for the remainder of their lives-severing ties to their
family, friends, and their overall community.
4. The Emerging National Trend Against Requiring These
Teenagers to Register as Sex Offenders Is Further Evidence
That the States Still Requiring Registration Are
Violating the Eighth Amendment
The fourth factor in the Eighth Amendment analysis requires an
examination of how all the states and the federal government address
254. See Jenna Wortham, MySpace Turns over 90,000 Names of Registered Sex Offenders,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2009, at B4.
255. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Sex Play in Virtual Worlds, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127,
1128-29 (2009).
256. 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a)-(b) (Supp. 2008).
257. Wilson, supra note 255, at 1129 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 16915b(c)(5)(A)).
258. Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Limits?,
34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17, 29 (2008).
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the same scenario-consensual sex between teenagers where one
teenager is below the age of consent. When ruling on whether a cer-
tain punishment constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, "the Su-
preme Court has looked to the number of states that reject certain
punishments to determine whether there is a national consensus." 259
The Court reviews "legislative enactments and state practice[s]" re-
lated to the specific punishment as evidence of the "'[o]bjective indi-
cia' of society's standards." 260 Thus, while to a certain extent every
state criminalizes sexual activity with someone below the relevant
"age of consent"-a crime known as statutory rape261-a majority of
states have either decriminalized consensual teenage sex or created an
age-gap exemption.262 The idea is that "the risk of coercion is sub-
stantially decreased when partners are close in age." 263
Taking into consideration the trend among many of the states and
the federal government to decriminalize consensual sex between teen-
agers, there now appears to be a national consensus against making
teenage sex a crime. Evidence of this trend can be found in the fact
that thirty states currently have some form of age-gap provision in
place to decriminalize consensual sexual acts between two teenagers
close in age. 2 6 4 Therefore, although twenty states still lack age-gap
provisions, nine of these states have at least implemented their "age of
consent" at sixteen-meaning these states are able to counteract the
amount of cases of consensual sex that would otherwise be criminal
absent an age-gap provision. 265 In addition, in 1962, drafters of the
Model Penal Code (the MPC) took a stance against criminalizing sex
between teenagers close in age.26 6 The MPC makes clear that "willing
oral or vaginal sex by a person under sixteen years old with a person
within four years of the minor should not be the basis of criminal
liability. "267
259. Cohen, supra note 112, at 745.
260. Id.
261. See No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 72-73.
262. See supra notes 96-114 and accompanying text; see also Daryl J. Olszewski, Comment,
Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for Reform, 89 MARo. L. REV.
693, 706-07 (2006).
263. Olszewski, supra note 262, at 706.
264. See AGE OF CONSENT CHART, supra note 108 and accompanying text.
265. See id. (noting that Arkansas, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio,
Rhode Island, and South Dakota do not have age-gap provisions but have set their minimum age
of consent at sixteen).
266. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(a) (1980).
267. Siji A. Moore, Comment, Out of the Fire and into the Frying Pan: Georgia Legislature's
Attempt to Regulate Teen Sex Through the Criminal Justice System, 52 HOWARD L.J. 197, 224
(2008) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.3(1)(a)) (noting that "[tlhe commentary to the Model
Penal Code reasons that criminal law should not target" teenagers close in age because it is rare
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Following the enactment of the Adam Walsh Act in July of 2006, a
trend appeared to be forming among states in an attempt to mirror
the "close in age" exemption of the federal act.2 6 8 While noting that
"[s]tates vary widely in how they prosecute consensual teen sex," an
article from USA Today discussing the effect of the Adam Walsh Act
on individual state laws reported,
More states are bucking the national crackdown on sex offenders
by paring back punishment for teens who have consensual sex with
underage partners.
Governors in seven states have signed bills in the past two months
that mean no prosecution for some teens or no requirement to reg-
ister as a sex offender. 269
Moreover, in 2007, the Oregon legislature passed a law that would
permit a teenager as young as fourteen to consent to sex with another
teen so long as the other teen is no more than five years older.270 In
the same year in Florida, lawmakers set a minimum age of consent at
fourteen so long as the "offender" is no more than four years older
than the "victim." 271 Similarly, in Indiana, a teen is exempted from
registering so long as he or she is no more than four years older than
the victim and the "offender" and the "victim" were either in a dating
relationship or an ongoing personal relationship. 272 Although there
was already an age-gap provision in place, Connecticut amended its
sex offender legislation to extend the age gap from two years to three
years such that no crime exists if the "victim" is under sixteen years of
age but at least thirteen and the "offender" is no more than three
that an individual so close in age to his or her partner will be subject to exploitation due to
immaturity).
268. See Koch, supra note 104, at Al.
269. Id.
270. Wendy Koch, Defining a Sex Predator, for Life, USA TODAY, July 25, 2007, at 3A; see
also OR. REV. STAT. § 181.830(2) (Supp. 2010). Under the law, a person is no longer required to
register as a sex offender if
[t]he person is less than five years older than the victim . . . [t]he victim's lack of consent
was due solely to incapacity to consent by reason of being less than a specified age ...
(and the] victim was at least 14 years of age at the time of the offense or act ....
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.830(2).
271. Koch, supra note 104, at Al; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354(1)(c) (Supp. 2010).
[A] person shall be considered for removal of the requirement to register as a sexual
offender or sexual predator only if the person: ... [i]s not more than 4 years older than
the victim of this violation who was 14 years of age or older but not more than 17 years
of age at the time the person committed this violation.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354(1)(c).
272. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.04354(1)(c); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-9(e) (Supp. 2009)
(exempting from registration situations where "[tihe person is not more than four years older
than the victim . ... [and] [t]he relationship between the person and the victim was a dating
relationship or an ongoing personal relationship").
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years older.273 Even Texas-often considered a conservative state-
has had an age-gap provision in place since 2001.274 In Texas, "judges
have . . . discretion to grant an exemption from registration in cases
involving teens with an age difference of [four] years or less" 2 7 5 -
presuming the offender is below the age of nineteen and the victim is
at least thirteen.276
In 2010 alone, there was much activity within state legislatures ac-
tively debating the issue. In early 2010, South Dakota legislators were
feverishly attempting to change their current sex offender registry in
order to make the overall registry more effective at monitoring the
most dangerous offenders.277 Part of the proposed plan would permit
the removal of teenage offenders who found themselves on the regis-
try solely because they engaged in consensual sex with another teen-
ager below the state's age of consent.278 As recently as March 2010,
the Georgia House of Representatives passed a bill that "would let
certain inmates petition the courts to remove them from the state sex
offender registry after completing their sentences, like . . . so-called
Romeo and Juliet statutory rape cases, in which the teens are close in
age."279
Therefore, because of this apparent trend towards a national con-
sensus against criminalizing consensual sex between teenagers, the
state laws that still criminalize such acts by requiring the teenagers to
register as sex offenders are violative of the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
273. Colin Poitras, Harsher Predator Bill Advances, HARTFORD CouRANT, May 30, 2007, at
Bl; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-71(a)(1) (West 2007) (exempting certain consensual
relationships unless "[sluch other person is thirteen years of age or older but under sixteen years
of age and the actor is more than three years older than such other person").
274. Editorial, Texas Rep. Todd Smith's Sex Offender Registration Bill Is a Common-Sense
Revision, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, May 14, 2009, at A8.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Eryn Clement, Sex Offender Legislation Moves Through Capitol, Soum- DAKOTA PUB.
BROADCASTING (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.sdpb.org/tv/shows.aspx?MedialD=57899&ParmAc-
cessLevel=sdpb-all&Parmtype=TV.
278. See Ben Dunsmoor, SD Sex Offender Registry May See Tiered System, KELOLAND.
coM (Jan. 28, 2010, 9:07 PM), http://www.keloland.com/News/NewsDetail6375cfm?Id=95841
(noting that the proposed changes to South Dakota's sex offender registry would not entirely
remove teenagers forced to register based solely on their engagement in sex acts with other
teenagers below the age of consent but rather these teenagers would only be required to register
for ten years and then could petition the court for removal).
279. Jim Wallace, Low Risk Sex Offenders May Get a Break, WALB NEWS (Mar. 21, 2010,
11:31 AM), http://www.walb.com/Global/story.asp?S=12157971.
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5. A Comparative Look at How Other Nations Address Age of
Consent Issues Further Demonstrates a Global Consensus
Against Criminalizing Consensual Sex
between Teenagers
As discussed earlier, an analysis of other countries is relevant here
to determine if there is an international consensus against criminaliz-
ing consensual sex among teenagers. First, because of the large num-
ber of foreign countries with ages of consent drastically lower than
many of the individual states, there is a clear global consensus against
criminalizing otherwise consensual teenage sex where one teenager is
slightly younger. Second, in addition to the overall lower ages of con-
sent, there also appears to be a global consensus advocating for con-
siderably less stringent sex offender laws.
Currently, there is a clear majority among foreign countries to ad-
vocate for considerably lower ages of consent than in the United
States. If we were to review merely countries within the Western
Hemisphere, "38% of the population [here] lives in countries with the
age of consent set at [fifteen] or less." 2 s0 To date, twenty European
nations have set their age of consent below sixteen. 281 France's age of
consent is fifteen; 282 Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Italy, and
Portugal all set their minimum age of consent at fourteen. 283 In Spain,
a teenager as young as thirteen is deemed capable of consenting to
sexual relations with anyone of his or her choice.284 Although Canada
raised its age of consent from fourteen to sixteen in 2008, the legisla-
ture made sure to include a "close in age" exemption for teen part-
ners' ages that are within five or fewer years of one another.285 Thus,
the Canadian government deems a boy or girl as young as twelve ca-
pable of giving consent to sex presuming his or her partner is not older
than seventeen.286
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has always paid particular at-
tention to the laws of the United Kingdom because of the "historic
280. Eugene Volokh, "Statutory Rape" in The Reader, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 25, 2008,
1:24 PM), http://volokh.com/2008/12/25/statutory-rape-in-the-reader/.
281. Tatchell, supra note 206.
282. Id.
283. Kirsty Walker & Sarah Harris, Age of Consent Storm over BBC Debate About Making
Sex Legal for Girls Under 16, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 22, 2009, 8:45 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.
uk/news/article-1215164/BBC-Radio-4-host-debate-letting-girls-16-sex.html; see also Tatchell,
supra note 206.
284. Tatchell, supra note 206.
285. Eleanor Maticka-Tyndale, Sexuality and Sexual Health of Canadian Adolescents: Yester-
day, Today and Tomorrow, 17 CAN. J. Hum. SEXUALITY 85, 88 (2008).
286. See id.
1208 [Vol. 60:1169
WHEN YES MEANS NO, LEGALLY
ties between our countries and in light of the Eighth Amendment's
own origins." 287 As it stands, the Sexual Offences Act of 2003 sets the
United Kingdom's national age of consent at sixteen.28 8 However,
over the past few years there has been a growing movement by legal
scholars to reduce the age of consent to account for and essentially
decriminalize the drastic number of teenagers who have their first sex-
ual experience at that age.289 Like the United Kingdom, Ireland has
recently seen a movement to lower the age of consent from seventeen
to sixteen.290 Even with Ireland's current age of consent, almost 85%
of cases that have been prosecuted since 2006 where someone was
below the age of consent had an age gap of six years or more.291 Thus,
Ireland is at least arguably making indirect attempts towards
decriminalizing consensual sex between teenagers close in age.2 92
Not only do a majority of countries advocate for lower ages of con-
sent as a means to decriminalize consensual teenage sex, but with the
exception of the United Kingdom,293 most of these countries either do
not have any sex offender laws, or if they do, they are remarkably less
stringent than those in the United States-both federally and at the
individual state or province level. 2 9 4 For instance, despite the global
impact felt by the rest of the world following the heinous murders and
sexual abuse of Jacob, Megan, and Adam,295 fewer than ten other na-
tions have enacted sex offender legislation.296
In Canada, there is no community notification requirement for reg-
istered sex offenders; rather, only law enforcement agencies have ac-
287. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
288. Walker & Harris, supra note 283.
289. See, e.g., Tatchell, supra note 206; see also Rebecca McQuillan, Teenage Sex Prosecution
Move Has Split Opinion, HERALD SCOTLAND (May 10, 2008), http://www.heraldscotland.com/
teenage-sex-prosecution-move-has-split-opinion-1.880261; Miranda Sawyer, Sex Is Not Just for
Grown-Ups, GUARDIAN UK (Nov. 2, 2003), http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2003/nov/02/
schools.uk.
290. Marie O'Halloran, Sexuality, Information Reproductive Health and Rights, IR. TIMES ON-
LINE (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.irishtimes.comlnewspaper/ireland/2009/1223/1224261160508.
html.
291. Carol Coulter, Lifelong Stigma over Having Non-Coercive Sex with Girl, IR. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2009, at 14.
292. See id.
293. See Jacob Frumkin, Comment, Perennial Punishment? Why the Sex Offender Registration
and Notification Act Needs Reconsideration, 17 J. L. & POL'Y 313, 353 (2008) (noting "Great
Britain uses a scheme most similar to that of SORNA" and that like SORNA, the intended
purpose of the Sexual Offences Act of 2003 is "to strengthen and modernise the law on sexual
offences, whilst improving preventative measures and the protection of individuals from sexual
offenders" (citations omitted)).
294. Id. at 351-52.
295. See supra notes 53-87 and accompanying text.
296. Frumkin, supra note 293, at 352 (citing No Easy Answers, supra note 88, at 118).
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cess to the database.297 Thus, in comparison to the United States,
Canada provides much greater protection to the offender against civil-
ian abuse, discrimination, and vigilantism.298 Similarly, in Australia,
"[tihe information in the [sex offender] registry is 'restricted to the
greatest extent that is possible . . .' and can generally only be accessed
by police officers." 299 In addition, even more unlike the draconian
scope of those required to register in the United States, Australia lim-
its which offenders must register to only "those convicted of sexual or
other serious offenses against children." 3 o Finally, even in the United
Kingdom-the nation that arguably has the most similar sex offender
legislation to that of the United States-there is less enforcement for
those offenders who must register.301 The United Kingdom, like Aus-
tralia and Canada, also denies the public access to the registry and
limits it to government officials.302 The United Kingdom also rejected
the idea of imposing any sort of residency restriction.303
In sum, the lack of any global acceptance of harsh sex offender laws
that allow registry access to the public, combined with evidence that
there is an international consensus against criminalizing sexual behav-
ior among teenagers, supports the argument that continuing to
criminalize such behavior in the United States violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
6. Requiring Teenagers Who Engaged in Consensual Sex with
Other Teenagers to Register as Sex Offenders Serves No
Measurable Contribution to the Acceptable Goals of
Punishment
"The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence
must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal
offender." 304
Finally, after weighing the factors and looking to the approaches
taken by other nations, it is essential to determine whether the penalty
imposed-registering as a sex offender-serves any measurable con-
tribution to the acceptable goals of punishment.305 The rationale be-
hind punishing someone for his wrongful actions originates from the
297. Id. at 354.
298. See id.
299. Id. at 355 (quoting Child Sex Offenders Registration Act, 2006, § 44 (Austl.)).
300. Id.
301. See id. at 353.
302. Id.
303. Autumn Long, Note, Sex Offender Laws of the United Kingdom and the United States:
Flawed Systems and Needed Reform, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 159 (2009).
304. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 138, 149 (1987).
305. See supra notes 159-67 and accompanying text.
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notion that we all must be held accountable for what we have chosen
to do.3 06 The Supreme Court has stated that in order for a punish-
ment to not be deemed cruel and unusual, "the punishment imposed
upon an individual 'cannot be so totally without penological justifica-
tion that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.'"307 To that
end, the Eighth Amendment requires courts to consider "whether the
penological goals of [a specific] penalty can be achieved through" the
imposition of such penalty.308
Society justifies imposing penalties upon those who choose to break
the law under the guise of promoting deterrence, retribution, and re-
habilitation.309 As will be discussed below, requiring teenagers to reg-
ister as sex offenders promotes none of the three intended penological
goals.310 First, because of the commonality of teenage sex and the
sparse, inconsistent prosecution of such cases, teenagers are not de-
terred from continuing to have sexual relations with one another.31'
Second, requiring teenagers to register does not serve the goal of ret-
ribution because it is difficult to make the argument that teenagers
deserve to be so severely punished for engaging in such a common,
generally accepted act.3 12 Third, because of the consensual nature of
the act, the goal of rehabilitation is ineffective and completely lost on
teenagers who are not sexual predators and cannot be changed. 313
306. See O'Hanlon, supra note 166, at 418.
307. Bethany C. Bryant, Comment, Expanding Atkins and Roper: A Diagnostic Approach to
Excluding the Death Penalty as Punishment for Schizophrenic Offenders, 78 Miss. L.J. 905, 908
(2009) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)).
308. Id.
309. See Wendy S. Cash, A Search for "Wisdom, Justice, and Moderation" in Wilson v. State,
42 NEw ENG. L. REV. 225, 237 (2007) (citing JAMES RACHELS, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL PHI-
LOSOPHY 131-32 (2d ed. 1993)); see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) ("A sentence
can have a variety of justifications, such as . . . deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation.");
O'Hanlon, supra note 166, at 420 (recognizing the "incapacitation" justification for punishment
where society believes that detaining a high-risk offender is in its best interests). However, be-
cause this Comment deals with the effects of sex offender laws and not sentences this justifica-
tion will not be addressed in further detail.
310. See infra notes 314-43 and accompanying text.
311. See infra notes 314-28 and accompanying text.
312. See infra notes 329-33 and accompanying text.
313. See infra notes 334-43 and accompanying text.
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a. Because Statistics Show that the Majority of Teenagers Are
Sexually Active Combined with the Reality that Such
Cases Are Selectively Prosecuted, Sex Offender Laws
Do Not Deter Teenagers from Having Sex with
One Another
To begin, the "deterrence" justification is unconvincing because
very few teenagers who have sex are prosecuted-and thus teenagers
are left undeterred in their actions. In a perfect world, forms of pun-
ishment should be designed to deter prospective offenders from com-
mitting the offense under the premise that "[d]eterrence presupposes
free will to the extent that people will be able to alter their actions so
as to comply with the law and avoid punishment." 314 However, most
sex offender laws "are premised more on emotional sentiments such
as disgust, morality, and fear, than on rational assessments of crime
reduction."3 15 Therefore, a teenager debating whether to have what
he thinks to be consensual sex with his slightly younger girlfriend is
unlikely to perceive the risks and repercussions that follow if caught
and convicted in order to "correctly" conform his behavior to the rele-
vant state law. As bioethicist and medical historian Jacob M. Appel
observed, "Teenagers are smart. They understand that sex can be
pleasurable and that it can enhance the intimacy of their relationships.
Telling them otherwise-by insisting, for example, that 'sex is for
adults only'-defies their lived reality." 316
Though taken from the context of a capital-offense case, the Su-
preme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma317 observed that "[t]he likeli-
hood that the teenage offender has made the kind of cost-benefit
analysis" that takes the penalty into consideration is unlikely.3 18 In
addition, "[g]iven current patterns of teenage sexual activity, it is
probably safe to say that efforts to prevent teenagers . . . from engag-
ing in anything potentially sexually stimulating are at best unrealis-
tic." 3 1 9 Therefore, combining the Supreme Court's rationale on
deterrence and teenage offenders and Appel's realistic view on how
teenagers view sex, a teenager contemplating sex with another teen-
314. O'Hanlon, supra note 166, at 418; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
315. Elizabeth Garfinkle, Coming of Age in America: The Misapplication of Sex-Offender Re-
gistration and Community-Notification Laws to Juveniles, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 163, 168 (2003).
316. Jacob M. Appel, Embracing Teenage Sexuality: Let's Rethink the Age of Consent, HuF-
FINGTON POST (Jan. 1, 2010, 5:45 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/jacob-m-appellembracing-
teenage-sexuali b_409136.html.
317. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
318. Id. at 837.
319. Dailard, supra note 212, at 14.
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ager is more likely to think of the act's pleasurable effects than how
the law may judge him.320
Separately, the selective prosecution of "statutory rape" cases that
must precede labeling a teenager as a sex offender also counteracts
the deterrence principle. First, if half of the teenage population in the
United States is sexually active, it would seem impossible to prosecute
all occurrences of statutory rape between two consenting teenagers. 321
The resources are simply not there.322 One commentator points out
that "reporting and proving all these violations [is] difficult as many of
the consenting victims would not report the crime or assist in the pros-
ecution." 323 Second, 43% of such cases that are successfully prose-
cuted involve teenage pregnancy-the pregnancy making the
appearance and subsequent proof of the crime of statutory rape irref-
utable.324 With proper use of contraceptives, it would seem highly un-
likely that a regular case of two teenagers having consensual sex will
ever face prosecution.
Therefore, the sporadic and unpredictable rate at which these types
of cases are prosecuted leads teenagers to believe that they will not be
caught if they have sex with someone below the age of consent. 325
Admittedly, we could solve the problem of selective prosecution by
attempting to increase the overall rates of statutory rape prosecutions.
However, is that something society truly wants to do?
Hypothetically speaking, law enforcement agencies and prosecutors
handle their limited resources by targeting the cases that involve vio-
lent acts of rape and child sexual abuse.326 Without providing enough
resources to fund this sort of statutory rape "witch-hunt," an agenda
must be set to determine which types of cases deserve prosecutorial
priority.327MOst of society would sleep better at night knowing that
some of its tax dollars are going towards prosecuting pedophiles and
child molesters-and not toward otherwise voluntary, consensual ac-
320. See Appel, supra note 316.
321. See Steve James, Comment, Romeo and Juliet Were Sex Offenders: An Analysis of the
Age of Consent and a Call for Reform, 78 UMKC L. REV. 241, 249 (2009).
322. See id.
323. Id.
324. Elizabeth Holienberg, Note, The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the
Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 267, 275 (1999).
325. See Moore, supra note 267, at 227 (noting that because selective prosecutorial discretion
decreases teenagers' perceived risks in actually being prosecuted for their actions, teenagers are
in actuality not deterred from choosing to have sex with other teenagers).
326. See Charles A. Phipps, Misdirected Reform: On Regulating Consensual Sexual Activity
Between Teenagers, 12 CORNELL J. L. & Pus. POL'Y 373, 437-38 (2003).
327. Id. at 438 (noting that with respect to child sexual abuse cases, "few jurisdictions would
have the desire or the ability to aggressively pursue [voluntary sexual activity] cases").
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tivity among teenagers. 328 Thus, the laws as applied to such teenagers
cannot be justified by a deterrence rationale.
b. Sex Offender Laws as Applied to Teenagers Do Not Serve the
Goal of Retribution Because a Teenager Does Not
Deserve to Be Punished for Engaging in
a Consensual Act
Like the deterrence theory, the second justification for an accept-
able form of punishment-retribution-also fails to advance any pe-
nal interest because teenagers cannot be held culpable for an act so
common for their age. To begin, the goal of retribution stems from
the theory that offenders "deserve" to be punished. 329 Moreover, in
Atkins v. Virginia,330 the Court held that "the severity of the appropri-
ate punishment necessarily depends on the culpability of the of-
fender." 331 Unlike a rapist or pedophile, a teen convicted of engaging
in consensual sex with another slightly younger teen hardly possesses
even a shred of culpability. Looking at the high levels of sexual activ-
ity among teenagers, it becomes difficult to hold the ones who happen
to engage in consensual sex with another teen slightly below the age
of consent more culpable for an act that more than half of his peers
are also engaging in.332 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated in
Thompson v. Oklahoma,
Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teen-
ager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct
while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated
by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons whyjuveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of
an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as mor-
ally reprehensible as that of an adult.333
It is clear that sex among teenagers is not a new trend, but rather for
the past half century, more and more teenagers are engaging in con-
sensual sex with one another. As discussed earlier, this type of behav-
ior is natural and developmentally appropriate. Therefore, their
behavior does not deserve punishment. However, according to the
laws that still criminalize such behavior, these teenagers allegedly de-
serve to be considered sex offenders. Are we prepared as a society to
328. Id. at 437 ("Societal forces appear to be moving irreversibly against the trend to criminal-
ize voluntary sexual activity between teenagers.").
329. O'Hanlon, supra note 166, at 420.
330. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
331. Id. at 319 (emphasis added).
332. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).
333. Id.
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label the millions of teens falling into this category sex offenders
under the premise that they truly deserve it?
c. The Penal Goal of Rehabilitation Is Ineffective Because the
Consequences of Sex Offender Legislation Make the
Offender a Societal Outcast
Finally, if these teenagers never posed a danger to themselves or
society in general, then the third justification for an acceptable form
of punishment-rehabilitation-is without merit. Admittedly, reha-
bilitation of an offender is a primary goal of any form of punish-
ment-especially in the context of teenage offenders.334 However, in
cases involving teenage offenders who only acquired the status of be-
ing offenders because of the age of their partners, the goal of rehabili-
tation can never succeed.335 This is not the case of a sexual predator.
The teen never posed a danger to the public at large, nor did he pose a
danger of re-offending.336 In addition, it can hardly be argued that
these teenagers need to register as sex offenders for life in order to
fulfill the rehabilitative punishment goal because likely within a few
years the slightly younger teenager-who at the time was deemed un-
able to consent-will have reached the relevant age of consent. Thus,
the actions are now legally consensual. And if the goal of rehabilitat-
ing an "offender" is due to the idea that once rehabilitated, the indi-
vidual will seamlessly fit right in with the rest of society, then
requiring a teenager to register and abide by notification laws works
against this goal. Instead of fitting in, the teenager is forcefully left
out. How can the teenager be a contributing member of society if no
employer is willing to hire him? If towns and cities put restrictive lim-
its barring almost all places where he can live, the teenager finds him-
self effectively banished.337
Moreover, the confidentiality of cases tried in juvenile courts has
historically been based on the premise that an adolescent's ability to
334. See O'Hanlon, supra note 166, at 419; see also Kristin Henning, What's Wrong with Vic-
tims' Rights in Juvenile Court?: Retributive Versus Rehabilitative Systems of Justice, 97 CALIF. L.
REv. 1107, 1118-19 (2009) ("Legislative action across the country, appellate court and Supreme
Court jurisprudence, and recent psychological and neurological studies in adolescent develop-
ment all demonstrate that juvenile courts can and should continue their efforts to rehabilitate
young offenders.").
335. See Young, supra note 8, at 480 (suggesting that applying adult standards of punishment
to juveniles replaces the rehabilitative intention with punitive results).
336. See Doeringer, supra note 86, at 201 (noting that sexual behavior among teenagers "is
not dangerous, deviant or even unusual").
337. See White, supra note 88, at 161 ("As these laws become more widespread, the concern is
that, eventually, these convicted criminals might have nowhere left to live [and thus] these sex
offender residency restrictions appear to be a modern-day version of banishment . . . .").
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rehabilitate is greatly dependent on privacy.338 It is believed that the
stigma created from making the conviction of an adolescent publicly
known hinders the success of the adolescent's rehabilitative efforts-
thus, it reduces the "impetus to become a productive citizen." 339 If
criminals are already viewed in some respect as societal outcasts, noti-
fying others about an adolescent's juvenile "missteps" further sepa-
rates them and breaks "relations with those in the community, such as
school administrators and teachers, friends, classmates, and prospec-
tive employers." 340 The goal of rehabilitating the offender to the ex-
tent that he is able to blend in with other members of society is lost
the moment his name hits the registry, permanently associating him
with sex offenders-the group with which society least wants to
associate.341
Furthermore, requiring teenagers to register as sex offenders based
solely on their actions in having sex with other, slightly younger teen-
agers is treating the symptom and not the disease. For instance, an
age of consent provision is based on the idea that a person, usually a
young teenage girl below a certain age, will not fully comprehend the
repercussions and unintended consequences of her sexual decisions. 342
Here, the repercussions and unintended consequences of such deci-
sions are cases of teen pregnancy and the contraction of sexually
transmitted diseases. 343 However, if the purpose of rehabilitative pun-
ishments is to prevent an undesirable future event from occurring then
labeling a teenager as a sex offender will not rehabilitate him or her
per se if the "undesired future event"-like an unwanted pregnancy or
the contraction of a sexually transmitted disease-has already oc-
curred. In essence, instead of developing means to mitigate "imma-
ture" actions, society is instead penalizing such actions. What public
good is being served when the dreaded "damage" has already been
done?
B. Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Applied to
Teenagers Engaging in Consensual Sex Is an Unfortunate
Attempt to Enforce Morality
"Our obligation is ... not to mandate our own moral code." 344
338. See Markman, supra note 52, at 281.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. See id.
342. See Oberman, supra note 100, at 704.
343. See id.
344. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992).
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Sex offender registration and notification laws applied to teenagers
engaging in consensual sex with one another is an unfortunate and
misguided attempt to enforce morality through legislation. To begin,
it would be fruitless to argue that we live in a society that does not
inject its moral views into the legislative agenda.345 From the late
nineteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme
Court repeatedly acknowledged the potential moral threats and dan-
gers posed by alcohol and gambling and upheld various state laws that
permitted government regulation of these industries. 346 Regardless of
our present-day culture, there will always be groups who "believe that
any sexual conduct outside of marriage is inherently immoral." 347
However, there is a significant difference between legislation that
may have the effect of regulating some form of an activity deemed
immoral by a sector of society, and a blatant attempt to ban such ac-
tivity because of its alleged immorality-especially in the context of
an individual's sexuality.348 It seems irrational to presume that when
teenagers fall slightly below that the age of consent it is as if they
magically lose all capability to determine whether they can or cannot
have consensual sex with other teenagers close in age.349 It is true that
there are significant risks that attach to teenage sexual conduct be-
cause their age and inexperience make them more susceptible to com-
pulsion and abuse by others-especially those who are older.350 But
this is true of any potential harm that teenagers face.351
Instead, society, via legislation, imposes its views-views that in re-
ality are just moral views.352 But it is improper for society to criminal-
ize an act or practice simply because there is a moral objection to it.
345. Moore, supra note 267, at 226 ("Laws that encourage sexual relations to be contained to
marriage are prevalent throughout United States' history.").
346. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After
Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1262 (2004).
347. Olszewski, supra note 262, at 699; see also Moore, supra note 267, at 226 n.233 (listing
laws in twenty-three states that continue to echo the immorality of sexual acts outside of
marriage).
348. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 346, at 1273-76 (discussing the premise behind a number
of recent cases in which the Court rejected moral justification and noting the Court's movement
"away from embracing morals-based arguments as independently sufficient to justify other re-
strictions related to sexuality").
349. See Moore, supra note 267, at 225 ("Some commentators have suggested that because of
their immaturity, [teenagers] are incapable of giving meaningful consent and therefore any con-
duct involving [a teenager] is inherently nonconsensual.").
350. Oberman, supra note 100, at 704.
351. See Moore, supra note 267, at 225 ("Concerns over a minor's ability to protect [himself]
from the influences of opportune adults permeate the law. Minors may disaffirm contracts, are
prohibited from drinking alcohol, and are not allowed to vote.").
352. See Cohen, supra note 112, at 753 (noting that sex offender laws as applied to these teens
regulate conduct that "while frowned upon, does not suggest a danger to the community").
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The Supreme Court found that "the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting [such] prac-
tice."353 In addition, "the right to make certain decisions regarding
sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship." 3 5 4 Though it
has not been formally recognized, in extending this right beyond the
marital relationship, it should extend to cover consensual relationships
among teenagers. In addition to such rights against governmental in-
trusion into moral matters, there is a generally recognized right to pri-
vacy.3 5 5 Therefore, not only should teenagers have a right to be
protected against the government's criminalization of their allegedly
"immoral behavior," but teenagers' decisions to have sex with one an-
other should be protected under their general right to privacy.
In sum, when weighing the gravity of consensual teenage sex against
the harshness of registering as a sex offender, it is clear that the pun-
ishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense. In addition to simi-
lar evidence of most foreign nations, considering the recent trend
among many states and the federal government to decriminalize con-
sensual sex between teenagers, there is a national consensus against
requiring teenagers to register as sex offenders. Finally, since alleged
immorality is not an acceptable justification for punishment, forever
branding teenagers as sex offenders serves none of the penological
goals of deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. Therefore, requir-
ing teenagers to register as sex offenders for having sex with slightly
younger teenagers violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments.
IV. IMPACT
"[R]egistration for sex offenders appears reasonable, until one con-
siders what a 'sex crime' is and who 'sex offenders' are." 356
Assuming arguendo that states repeal their respective legislation
criminalizing consensual sex among teenagers, this Comment's final
Part addresses the predicted consequences that removing these teen-
agers' names would have on the effectiveness of current registries.
First, when considering equitable principles, it is important to balance
353. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
354. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003).
355. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (recognizing that although the
Constitution does not explicitly state there is a general right to privacy, the various guarantees
within the Bill of Rights have penumbras and thereby establish an implicit right to privacy).
356. Kelsey Meeks Duncan, Comment, A Crime Against Common Sense: How Louisiana's
Implementation of the Adam Walsh Act Exposes the Law's Most Significant Flaw, 84 TUL. L.
REv. 429, 437 (2009).
[Vol. 60:11691218
WHEN YES MEANS NO, LEGALLY
the public and private interests involved. The preceding Part of this
Comment dealt specifically with the private interests involved-the
interests of these teenagers in being free from the unconstitutional
burdens of registering as sex offenders.357 Now, however, it is impor-
tant to consider the public interests at stake. While people may disa-
gree over the precise methods to monitor and protect against sex
offenders, most are willing to at least agree that there are dangerous
sexual predators out there-living openly among us but with their
identities hidden-and that it is in the public's interest to implement
ways to ensure the public's safety.
Finally, it is time to address the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the
room: teenagers having sex. Admittedly, teenage sex is a topic on
which society's opinion is greatly split. Nonetheless-when two teen-
agers are contemplating having sex with one another-the only opin-
ions that matter are those of the two teenagers. Regardless of the
potential for punishment and public stigma, the ultimate decision rests
solely with them. Thus, instead of labeling the teenager a sex of-
fender, it is worth considering the benefits of early sex education.
That is, whether society should, society will never be able to prevent
teenage sex from occurring. Nonetheless, at least there is the
chance-and a chance worth taking-to teach and encourage safe and
responsible sexual decisions.
A. After Decriminalizing Consensual Teenage Sex and Removing
These Teenagers from the Sex Offender Registries, Society
Will Be Able to Better Identify, Monitor, and Protect
Against the Most Dangerous Sexual Predators
When discussing whether teenagers should register as sex offenders
for consensual acts with other teenagers, it must be noted that the
private interests of the teenage "offenders" are not the only interests
at stake. The public has an equal interest in being free from violent
offenses committed by unmonitored sexual predators. What makes
the public's interest even more difficult to fulfill is that, unlike the
severe sentences imposed for murder convictions, in reality most sex
offenders, if incarcerated, will be released within their lifetime.358
Therefore, considering the number of offenders released into commu-
nities across the nation each year and society's fear of sex offender
recidivism, laws are consistently being passed or amended to develop
357. See supra notes 192-355 and accompanying text.
358. See Brian K. Payne & Matthew DeMichele, Warning: Sex Offenders Need to Be Super-
vised in the Community, 72 FED. PROBATION 37, 37 (2008).
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measures to further protect against reoffending. 359 Both state and
federal registration and community notification requirements "have
traditionally been justified as deterring sex offenders from reoffending
[by] providing law enforcement with an invaluable starting point when
a sex crime is committed [in addition to] facilitating the public's ability
to protect itself."360 In addition, "[i]t is anticipated that such registries
will increase community awareness, making sex offenders feel more
susceptible to the risks associated with offending." 361
However, in recent years following the expansion of the multiple
categories of sex offenders required to register, the validity of such
justifications has been called into question. For one, many state regis-
try requirements are overbroad and over-inclusive, including many in-
dividuals who quite evidently pose no real threat to the public at large
or to their alleged victims. 36 2 But it is not simply the rights of those
individuals mentioned above that are being violated; rather, these
overly broad laws do a disservice to the rights of all members of soci-
ety to have laws that actively monitor the most dangerous sexual
predators out there-those most likely to reoffend. Society is not pro-
tected by laws that require such a large group of individuals to register
and carry the stigmatic label of a sex offender without truly weeding
out the actual predators from the unfortunate teenagers who maybe-
for a myriad of other reasons-should have waited another year to
have sex with their girlfriends.
At this point, there should be an agreement among lawmakers that
"[t]he right people to be identified [and thus required to register] are
sexual predators who prey on young children instead of teenagers en-
gaging in consensual sex" with other teenagers close in age.363 And as
it follows, by removing these teenagers from the scope of sex offender
laws, law enforcement agencies and society at large will be in a better
position to protect against the threats of real sexual predators.364
However, "due to the uninformative, offense-based classification of
sex offenders on registries, law enforcement is often powerless to as-
sess which offenders are most likely to re-offend, preventing concen-
359. See id. ("The sheer number of sex offenders released into the community, and the impor-
tance of community supervision of sex offenders, demonstrates the need for adequately prepar-
ing probation and parole officers in their roles as sex offender 'monitors."').
360. Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 731-32.
361. Richard Tewksbury & Matthew B. Lees, Sex Offenders on Campus: University-Based Sex
Offender Registries and the Collateral Consequences of Registration, 70 FED. PROBATION 50, 50
(2006).
362. Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 732.
363. Cohen, supra note 112, at 751.
364. See id. at 753-54.
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tration on those who present the biggest threat to the surrounding
community." 365 The consequences of law enforcement's weakening
ability to adequately monitor the sex offenders on their registries en-
danger all of society.3 66
As mentioned at the beginning of the Comment, the discovery of
Jaycee Dugard after nearly two decades of captivity by a convicted sex
offender 367 should have been the wake-up call for sex offender law
reform that society desperately needs. Along with Jaycee's discovery
came the exposure of the obvious weaknesses of California's sex of-
fender registration and notification laws that allowed convicted of-
fender Phillip Garrido to spend eighteen years heinously raping and
fathering children with a girl (now a woman) against her will. 3 6 8 Of-
fered as a defense for the law enforcement agencies' actions-or in
this case, inaction-some commentators argue that the large number
of offenders required to register depletes the availability of resources
necessary to effectively monitor each offender. 369 As one scholar
noted, "[Tihese lengthy registration periods and widespread over-
breadth in registration scope tend to overburden law enforcement
agencies, both fiscally and practically." 370 Ernie Allen, of the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children, alleges that while
local law enforcement agencies are required by law to monitor sex
offenders upon their release from prison, "[t]he system ... to do mon-
itoring and supervision follow-up once they return to the community
is just overwhelmed." 371 Moreover, with the economy in its current,
365. Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 733.
366. See Lara Geer Farley, Note, The Adam Walsh Act: The Scarlet Letter of the Twenty-First
Century, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 471, 487 (2008) ("Not only are law enforcement officials unable to
identify which sex offenders pose the greatest risk to the public, but law enforcement is also
unable to keep track of the vast amount of offenders required to register.").
367. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
368. See Malia Wollan, Report Faults Parole System in Abduction, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at
A16.
369. See Jesse McKinley, Kidnap Victim Wins Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs, July 2, 2010, at A17;
Solomon Moore, Struggling to Keep Tabs on Paroled Sex Offenders, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009,
at 14; see also Peter Dujardin, Tough Task Tracking Sex Offenders, DAILY PRESS, Jan. 24, 2010,
at Al (reporting that the Virginia State Police troopers who are assigned to monitor registered
sex offenders are drastically understaffed and their resources are ill-equipped to effectively mon-
itor such offenders); see also Editorial, Arrests up, Monitoring down, LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 27,
2009, at 4 (reporting that the "[flaw enforcement agencies [in Nevada] charged with tracking the
increasing number of offenders who are paroled or sentenced to probation are severely under-
staffed" and arguing that "Congress and the states should devise new funding plans so parole
and probation officers are proportionate to the number of offenders they must supervise").
370. Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 733.
371. Ian Urbina & Christopher Maag, After Gruesome Find, Anger at Cleveland Police, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, at Al (quoting Ernie Allen, Nat'l Center for Missing and Exploited
Children).
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fragile condition, states simply do not have the budgets necessary for
their respective law enforcement agencies to make any sort of con-
certed effort to monitor every offender. 372
Due to the excessive number of individuals required to register as
sex offenders and the limited resources available to law enforcement
agencies, everyone is suffering.373 However, lawmakers protect their
political self-interest by either (1) remaining silent on the issue of
whether sex offender laws need reform or (2) advocating reform-but
reform in the sense of stricter provisions.374 It is time for lawmakers
to relinquish their fears of appearing soft on crime. It is time for
lawmakers to stop "calling for a host of radical measures without ra-
tionally evaluating them." 375
In addition, state governments have yet to embrace the Adam
Walsh Act due to fear that compliance with "the registry [require-
ment] would create an overwhelming monitoring burden and [be-
cause] it uses crude means of assessing the likelihood that offenders
might repeat their crimes."3 76 Perhaps states would be less apprehen-
sive about implementing the Adam Walsh Act if they could be reason-
ably reassured that state dollars would not be wasted on monitoring
the non-predatory offender-like the teenager who currently must
register for having had consensual sex with his girlfriend.377 Instead,
Congress was more or less forced to extend the deadline for compli-
ance to July 2010 after all other states aside from Ohio failed to com-
ply with the Act.37 8 The states are never going to develop enough
faith in the system to comply until they believe the system is actually
designed to further the goals of its preamble. And if protecting the
public from the most dangerous offenders is its goal, then removing
these harmless teenagers is definitely the first step. Because these
teenagers were never dangerous, removing them would not require a
separate assessment of their level of risk for future offenses. Rather,
372. See Greenblatt, supra note 49 ("[A]s many states face persistent budget shortfalls, it's
become a real question how well law enforcement can keep track of such a large caseload.").
373. See Urbina & Maag, supra note 371, at Al.
374. See Tregilgas, supra note 3, at 748.
375. Id.
376. The Problem of Sex Offenders, supra note 78.
377. See James Hart, Do Sex-Offender Laws Really Protect the Public?, KANSAS Crry STAR
ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2010, 3:53 PM), http://blogs.kansascity.com/crimescene/2010/02/do-sexof-
fender-laws-really-protect-the-public.html (noting that since major sex offender legislation was
passed in Florida following the murder of Jessica Lunsford in 2005, the state now spends thirty-
six million dollars a year more on monitoring sex offenders yet the rate of sex offenses has yet to
decline).
378. See Wendy Koch, Many Sex Offenders Are Kids Themselves, USA TODAY, Jan. 4, 2010,
at 3A; The Problem of Sex Offenders, supra note 78.
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these teenagers were merely on the list to begin with due to
lawmakers' moral discontent with premarital sex.
Human Rights Watch-the organization responsible for the near
200-page 2007 report detailing the need for sex offender legislation
reform-argues that "pouring scarce resources into monitoring all
convicted offenders means there is less money for program[s] to pre-
vent sexual violence and counsel victims and for the rape investigation
units, rape evidence testing and other tools that could bring justice in
these cases." 379 Human Rights Watch advocates for sex offender leg-
islation to shift from mere monitoring to actual prevention-based pro-
grams. This would lessen the need for constant surveillance of
offenders by offering actual treatment to those in need, such that they
no longer felt the urge to reoffend.
Admittedly, most of this is a mere and overly optimistic hypotheti-
cal. But, while there may be little proof to offer that any of these
alternative systems would in reality turn out to be our "knight in shin-
ing armor" as a legislative answer, there is proof that our current sys-
tem is flawed. It is flawed to the extent that many states are fine with
grouping an eighteen-year-old average high school senior who hap-
pened to be caught in a sexual act with his younger-yet still teen-
age-girlfriend under the same name as child molesters and
pedophiles.
In sum, the abundance of information available on sex offender re-
gistries has had destructive consequences-including vigilante
murders of men labeled as sex offenders simply because they had sex
years ago with their slightly younger teenage girlfriends while actual
convicted predators like Garrido spend almost two decades eluding
law enforcement officials.
B. Education as an Effective Alternative to
the Sex Offender Registry
"Let's talk about sex, baby. Let's talk about you and me. Let's talk
about all the good things and the bad things that may be."380
Perhaps it is time for a serious discussion about mandatory sex edu-
cation and not just abstinence-only programs. As one author de-
scribed it:
Teens receive conflicting messages about adolescent sexuality
from the adult world. Adults can create works that seem to portray
adolescent sexuality by using younger looking actors; in fact, doing
379. Sarah Tofte, America's Flawed Sex Offender Laws, Hum. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 5, 2009),
http://www.hrw.orglen/news/2009/09/05/americas-flawed-sex-offender-laws (emphasis added).
380. SALT-N-PEPA, Let's Talk About Sex, on BLACKS' MAGic (Next Plateau Music 1990).
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so is within their First Amendment rights. Many popular television
shows and mainstream films portray teenage characters who are
sexually active and even sometimes sex-obsessed. Yet at the same
time many school districts limit teens' sex education to the absti-
nence-only framework.38'
As discussed earlier, requiring teenagers to register as sex offenders
based solely on their actions in having sex with other slightly younger
teenagers is treating the symptom, not the disease-that is, with teen-
age sex being the metaphorical "disease." 382 For starters, the United
Kingdom passed a law enforcing compulsory sex education for the
year prior to the teenager turning sixteen-the age of consent.383 In
addition, it is clear from the statistics on the prevalence of sex among
teenagers that promoting abstinence only is not suddenly going to
catch on. Since "[tihe advent of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s
spurred states to reevaluate their sex education policies," 3 M there has
been a remarkable decline in sex education and the past twenty-five
years have been more or less filled with an empty silence on continu-
ing sex education in the classroom. Currently, twenty-one states and
the District of Columbia "mandate that public schools teach sex edu-
cation."3 85 However, this means that the majority of states have ab-
stained from requiring sex education in their public schools.386
Part of the reasoning behind statutory rape laws and punishing an
individual for having sex with someone below the age of consent is
drawn from the need to deter such actions that may lead to unwanted
pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). Therefore, in-
stead of punishing teenagers for having sex with other teenagers, legis-
latures should consider teaching these teenagers the potential
negative consequences of having unprotected sex. If part of the goal
of branding an eighteen-year-old a sex offender for having consensual
sex with his younger girlfriend is to prevent the girl-who is presumed
unable to consent-from getting pregnant or contracting an STD, it
serves no purpose to punish him after the fact. If the girl is already
381. Amy F. Kimpel, Using Laws Designed to Protect as a Weapon: Prosecuting Minors Under
Child Pornography Laws, 34 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299, 328-29 (2010).
382. See supra notes 341-42 and accompanying text.
383. Laura Clark, Parents to Be Fined if They Take Their Children out of Sex Lessons, MAIL
ONLINE (Nov. 6, 2009, 9:49 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1225452/Parents-fined-
children-sex-lessons.html (noting that following the eventual imposition of mandatory sex educa-
tion classes as part of the national curriculum, British parents wil face severe fines if they at-
tempt to remove their fifteen-year-olds from such classes).
384. Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Sex and STIIHIV Education 1 (2010).
385. Id.
386. Jesse R. Merriam, Why Don't More Public Schools Teach Sex Education?. A Constitu-
tional Explanation and Critique, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 539, 540 (2007).
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pregnant or infected, who is made any better by the draconian conse-
quences of this law? Rather, sex education gives both the teenage boy
and teenage girl options before any decision is made.
Research conducted by NARAL Pro-Choice America (NARAL)
found that "[t]he public overwhelmingly supports age-appropriate,
comprehensive sex education, [however] anti-choice policymakers
have increasingly promoted restrictive abstinence-only programs that
censor information about contraception and STD/HIV prevention
strategies." 3 87 But choosing between abstinence-only sex education
and no education is really no choice. Further research showed that
the "assessment of the impact of formal sex education programs on
teen sexual health using ... abstinence-only programs had no signifi-
cant effect in delaying the initiation of sexual activity or in reducing
the risk for teen pregnancy and STD[s]." 88
Instead, NARAL takes the approach that "[t]eens must be given
the information necessary to protect themselves against unintended
pregnancy and STDs-and that begins with honest, age-appropriate,
and medically accurate sex education." 389 Here, research has shown a
correlation between individuals who received some form of formal
safe-sex education and a delay in when these same individuals chose
to engage in sexual intercourse for the first time.390 In addition, not
only did these individuals delay their first sexual experience, but there
was also an increase in the use of contraception for the first time.391
In sum, there is a difference between advocating for teenagers to
have sex-in general-and advocating for responsible behavior
among teenagers concerning all major life decisions. For starters, the
act of sex itself is not shameful-nor are the teenagers who are engag-
ing in it. As New York Times columnist Charles Blow wrote,
If there is a shame here, it's a national shame-a failure of our
puritanical society to accept and deal with the facts. Teenagers have
sex. How often and how safely depends on how much knowledge
and support they have. Crossing our fingers that they won't cross
the line is not an intelligent strategy.392
387. NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, Americans Support Responsible Sex Educa-
tion 1 (2009).
388. Pamela K. Kohler, Lisa E. Manhart & William E. Lafferty, Abstinence-Only and Com-
prehensive Sex Education and the Initiation of Sexual Activity and Teen Pregnancy, 42 J. ADO-
LESCENT HEALTH 344, 349 (2008).
389. NARAL Pro-Choice America Foundation, supra note 387, at 3.
390. Trisha E. Mueller, Lorrie E. Gavin & Aniket Kulkarni, The Association Between Sex
Education and Youth's Engagement in Sexual Intercourse, Age at First Intercourse, and Birth
Control Use at First Sex, 42 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 89, 93 (2008).
391. Id.
392. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Let's Talk About Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2008, at A17.
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Thus, it is a hard argument to make that "abstinence until marriage" is
still a policy worth fighting for when the fact of the matter is that the
war on preventing teenage sex has long been lost.3 93 It is a reality that
must be faced: the majority of Americans do not make it out of their
adolescence without having had sex, let alone wait until marriage. 394
V. CONCLUSION
"Sex offender laws do have their place in providing a general sense
of public safety.. .. However, public safety should not come at the
cost of others' rights."3 95
The state of sex offender laws in the United States is rather unstable
and evidently defective. Society is likely still reeling from the shock
suffered after Phillip Garrido, a convicted and registered sex offender,
held captive and sexually abused the young Jaycee Lee Dugard for
eighteen years, fooling law enforcement agencies and making a mock-
ery of the sex offender laws that were designed to prevent a crime like
this from ever happening.396 Perhaps enacted with good intentions,
these laws and their far-reaching scope have spun utterly out of con-
trol, dragging into their ambit teenagers who were caught having con-
sensual sex with other teenagers. Regardless of moral differences,
''even proponents of harsher penalties increasingly say there's value in
laws that recognize some sex offenders require more oversight than
others."3 97
With the fifty states and federal government unable to come to a
uniform agreement on how to address this issue of consensual teenage
sex where one partner is slightly younger, it is clear that reform is
necessary, and this inconsistency cannot stand. In a perfect world, sex
offender laws would identify to the public and law enforcement agen-
cies the most dangerous offenders, providing adequate means and re-
sources to monitor such offenders. But most importantly, sex
offender laws should only apply to actual offenders. Sex offender
laws should not apply to consensual sex between two teenagers. Per-
sonal morals aside, sex is all too common for American society's teen-
agers to ignore. In Lawrence v. Texas,398 the Supreme Court arguably
indicated a reluctance to allow states to legislate morality.399 Here we
393. John Santelli et al., Abstinence and Abstinence-Only Education: A Review of U.S. Policies
and Programs, 38 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 72, 73 (2006).
394. See id.
395. Long, supra note 303, at 167.
396. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
397. Greenblatt, supra note 49.
398. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
399. Id. at 577.
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are faced with a remarkably similar scenario-there are without a
doubt members of society that are morally opposed to teenagers en-
gaging in consensual sex with one another. However, that alone is not
enough to brand their conduct illegal and deserving of the label "sex
offender."
If there is even a miniscule amount of truth to the argument that
"sex offenders [are] a population enjoying the least amount of sympa-
thy from the media and the public,"400 then our lawmakers owe soci-
ety nothing less than ensuring that every labeled sex offender is truly
worthy of such a designation.
Emily J. Stine*
400. Hadar Aviram, Dangerousness, Risk, and Release, 7 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J.
175, 179 (2010).
* J.D. Candidate 2011, DePaul University College of Law; Bachelor of Arts 2008, Purdue
University. Many thanks to Christopher Kopacz who graciously guided me throughout the writ-
ing process, providing wonderful insight along the way. Thank you also to my family and friends
for their tireless love and support to which I owe my sanity. Lastly, thank you to the members of
the Volume 60 Editorial Board who, individually and as a whole, continue to amaze me with
their dedication and good company.
20111 1227
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:11691228
